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Executive Summary
The BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico is destined to take its place as one of the greatest
environmental disasters in the history of the United States, or for that matter, of the entire
planet. Like so many other disasters on that list, it was entirely preventable.
BP must shoulder its share of the blame, of course. Similarly, the Minerals Management
Service (MMS)—since reorganized and rebranded—has come under much deserved
criticism for its failure to rein in BP’s avaricious approach to drilling even where it was
unable to respond to a worst-case scenario in a responsible and timely fashion. But the
problems run much deeper than a single risk-taking company and a single dysfunctional
regulatory agency.
This report sketches out widespread regulatory failure, touching several agencies of the
federal government and affecting several critical environmental statutes. Prepared by
Member Scholars of the Center for Progressive Reform (CPR), it has two goals: (1) to
identify how and why the regulatory system failed to protect the public and environment
and prevent the BP disaster, and (2) to recommend the priority reforms that are essential to
correct these regulatory deficiencies.
The Deepwater Horizon explosion and well blowout have already been the subject of
intensive congressional investigation and will continue to be investigated by the National
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling and other
bodies in the months to come. Witnesses before Congress,
internal agency investigations, and media reports have also
Executive Summary.................................... 1
brought to light pieces of the picture of inadequacies in
the regulatory system, typically with a focus on a single
Introduction............................................. 10
agency or regulatory flaw. This report builds on, but does
not duplicate, this work uncovering the factual and technical The Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act (OCSLA)................................... 12
detail surrounding the disaster.
The report connects the dots among the various statutory
and regulatory regimes that should have prevented this
disaster and the attendant human, environmental, and
economic loss. It lays out a map of the regulatory failures
and provides a succinct guide to the key reforms that
are needed to avoid similar catastrophes in the future.
Specifically, it finds:
•

Regulators at the Department of the Interior’s
MMS routinely accepted assurances that a blowout
was unlikely and adopted safety and environmental standards developed by industry. The absence
of any technology-forcing mandate in the Outer
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The National Environmental
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Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) meant that industry lacked any incentive to
develop new and better safety technology.
•

The OCSLA authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to cancel oil leases or permits
if they “would probably cause serious harm or damage to life (including fish and
other aquatic life), to property, to any mineral (in areas leased or not leased), to the
national security or defense, or to the marine, coastal, or human environment.” But
the provision requires an extremely high level of proof to trigger protective action, proof that is rarely available, thus making the standard virtually meaningless.
A companion provision governing exploration plan approval requires even greater
proof to trigger protection, directing that an exploration plan shall be approved unless it would result in a similar condition.

•

The OCSLA is silent on how to incorporate consideration of environmental impacts into leasing decisions, even though this stage of the energy development process provides one of the most critical opportunities for environmental assessments.
Although the MMS regulations require consideration of all available environmental
information in deciding to conduct lease sales and direct the MMS to “evaluate fully
the potential effect of leasing on the human, marine and coastal environments” and
to develop mitigation measures, it is unclear whether any new information is generated or whether the agency merely assesses the very general information already
prepared at an earlier stage in the process.

•

Compliance with regulatory standards has been far from consistent, and the threat
of enforcement has not been a meaningful deterrent. The industry has operated in
a climate in which costs were routinely balanced against safety and environmental
protection. To motivate compliance with regulatory standards in such a climate, the
cost of a failure to comply must be high. Beyond profound problems associated
with the culture and funding of the MMS, several provisions in the OCSLA ensured
that the cost of noncompliance was minimal—most notably the feeble fine structure for violators. A maximum of $35,000 per day in civil penalties and $100,000
per day for criminal penalties does little to deter risk-taking in a multi-billion dollar
industry.

•

Difficult as it is to look beyond the egregious ethical violations and regulatory
failures at the MMS, it is nevertheless important to recognize that the agency lacks
important resources it needs to do the job of protecting the public and the environment, particularly in light of the scientific and engineering complexities inherent in
deepwater and ultra deepwater drilling. In addition, resources for enforcement are
lacking. According to one Department of the Interior official, the agency has 60
inspectors charged with covering almost 4,000 facilities in the Gulf of Mexico. It
needs more scientists, engineers, and inspectors.
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•

Over the course of several administrations, the MMS was “captured” by the oil
industry, and came to see industry, rather than public, as its constituency. That made
regulators particularly subject to pressure and influences from industry, and led to an
appalling lack of energy in its efforts to protect against industry excesses.

•

In 1986, the White House Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) rescinded a
1978 regulation under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) that required agencies to conduct a “worst-case analysis” in their Environmental Impact
Statements when important information regarding the potential consequences of
a proposed action was unknown or missing. Had that provision still been in place,
it would have forced more rigorous planning by the MMS, BP, and its industry colleagues, which in turn might have prevented the disaster or at least led to a more
effective response.

•

Over the years, some agencies have abused language in the CEQ’s NEPA regulations allowing them to use “categorical exclusions” to avoid preparing Environmental Impact Statements and Environmental Assessments for whole classes of
activities. Such exclusions are sometimes appropriate, but their excessively broad
application—most specifically in instances in which agency actions pose serious
environmental risks—has meant that many environmentally hazardous activities are
approved and implemented without any consideration of potential adverse consequences. The MMS was a serial abuser of the process, and that contributed to the
failed response to the BP disaster in the Gulf.

•

The MMS routinely ignored a requirement in the NEPA regulations that it consider
reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts—catastrophic ones, in particular—even when they are improbable. In the BP case, the MMS completely ignored
the risk of a serious oil spill, examining in its Environmental Impact Statement
the prospect of spills no larger than 4,600 barrels of oil. Further, in assessing the
aggregate risks of oil and gas drilling in the Gulf over the 40-year life of its plan
for the region, it contemplated only that 11,000 to 31,000 barrels might be spilled.
In the actual event, the BP spill unleashed an estimated 4.9 million barrels into the
Gulf.

•

In enforcing the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the National Marine Fisheries
Service and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (collectively, “the Services”) generally
rely on the “action agencies”—in the BP case, the MMS—to provide information to
complete their assessments of the dangers of certain actions to wildlife. Since the
MMS routinely underestimated the likelihood and magnitude of a spill, the Services
were handicapped in their assessments. Moreover, the Services tend to discount
risks, even catastrophic ones, if they are deemed to be low probability events, instead focusing on more predictable impacts, opening the door to disastrous results.

•

The Services, in carrying out consultations under the ESA, routinely fail to aggregate low probability risks of multiple federal or federally approved actions, despite
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regulations requiring consideration of such aggregate effects during the consultation
process.
•

Despite language in multiple statutes imposing the “Precautionary Principle” on federal decision-making, the MMS proceeded in precisely the manner that the principle
is designed to protect against—an indication that the principle is largely unobserved.
That is true not just at the MMS, but at other agencies charged with protecting
against harm to people and the environment.

Throughout the report, we offer a series of proposed reforms—some legislative, some
regulatory—aimed at closing the gaps in the regulatory safety net that allowed the BP
disaster to occur. They include:
•

Congress should amend the OCSLA to overhaul environmental review procedures,
require inter-agency consultation, and extend deadlines for review.

•

Congress should act to increase the OCSLA’s penalty and bonding amounts and to
provide for debarment of serious violators.

•

Congress should amend the OCSLA to adopt strong mandates for environmental
protection and safety, and to create incentives for continual safety innovation.

•

The President should request, and Congress should provide, adequate funding for the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement
(BOEMRE)—the successor agency to the MMS—so that it can perform its regulatory functions and hire, train, and retain competent staff.

•

The Department of the Interior leadership, including Secretary Ken Salazar, should
implement new ethics standards, ending the revolving door, and creating a culture
that supports the agency’s regulatory mission.

•

The reorganization that led to the creation of BOEMRE should be built upon with
further organizational reforms, including separating several of the agency’s existing
programs into separate shops.

•

The Administration, with leadership from the Department of the Interior, should
develop a proposed national policy for offshore oil and gas development that should
be the basis for debate in Congress.

•

With respect to NEPA, the CEQ should reinstate the regulatory requirement for
worst-case analysis planning, specifically, the entire 1978 regulation requiring worstcase analysis by agencies whenever they undertake an action despite the absence
of important or essential information regarding the action’s adverse environmental
impacts.

•

The CEQ should strengthen the categorical exclusion process, so that agencies cannot inappropriately exclude entire categories of activity from NEPA’s requirements.
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•

BOEMRE, like its predecessor, the MMS, lacks sufficient independent scientific
capacity to carry out its regulatory mission. The U.S. Geological Survey would be a
natural choice to provide such expertise, but would need authority and funding to
do so.

•

With respect to the Endangered Species Act, the Services should revise their regulations to ensure better assessment of low probability risks of harm to listed species. Similarly, the Services should revise their regulations to ensure that agencies
consider the aggregate impacts of low probability risks of serious harm, rather than
considering each in isolation.
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We also offer several broader recommendations aimed at systemic regulatory or energyrelated issues. They include:
•

Across the regulatory system, regulatory agencies, with leadership from the White
House Office of Management and Budget’s Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, should move to reinvigorate the Precautionary Principle, which embodies
two concepts: (1) we should act on the basis of reasonable evidence even before
we have full scientific proof that a particular industrial activity causes harm, and (2)
because some harms are irreversible, cost-benefit analyses are particularly inadequate
measures for deciding whether action is required.

•

Congress should repeal all subsidies for offshore oil drilling, applying to the energy
industry the same logic that it applies to other areas of human activity: The government need not subsidize highly profitable risky and dangerous activities.

•

Because the nation’s thirst for oil from all sources is the driver for the risks we take
by drilling for oil in remote locations and at considerable peril, Congress and the
President should adopt an effective climate change policy that reduces the demand
for offshore oil.

•

Congress should ensure that BOEMRE undertakes an ongoing, systematic evaluation of the lessons learned elsewhere in the wake of serious accidents off the shores
of other nations, and of alternative regulatory measures and techniques that have
proven effective in those settings.

In Table 1 (next page), we summarize the regulatory failures identified in this paper as
contributing to the BP oil spill, as well as the relevant proposed reforms for addressing these
regulatory failures, which, if adopted, will enable us to avoid similar catastrophes in the
future.
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Table 1.
Summary of Regulatory Failures and Related Reforms
The OCSLA

Regulatory Failure

Proposed Reform

Inadequate Mandates for
Safety and Environmental
Protection

•

Congress should require BOEMRE to incorporate consideration
of the environment and safety alongside energy production, as a
goal, policy, and mandate

•

Congress should incorporate a clear technology-forcing standard,
such as best available technology, for regulating oil development
technology

•

Congress should condition BOEMRE’s authority to approve
exploration and development plans on the submission by industry
of adequate data and analysis to demonstrate the safety of the
proposed activity and the adequacy of the spill response plan

•

Congress should direct BOEMRE to set federal spill response
performance standards

•

Congress should direct BOEMRE to study accident investigation,
information collection, and dissemination procedures employed
in other high risk industries that involve complex systems,
such as airlines and nuclear energy, and to develop a program
that maximizes the opportunity for continuous learning and
improvement

•

Congress should establish procedures for environmental review at
each step of the OCSLA’s four-stage decision-making process

•

Congress should establish an interagency consultation
requirement for each step of the OCSLA’s four-stage decisionmaking process

•

Congress should remove time limits for the Department of the
Interior to rule on exploration plans or, at the very least, should
extend those time limits considerably

•

Congress should clarify that compensation is not required when
the agency denies permits or plans for failure to comply with
statutory or regulatory requirements, including standards for
safety or environmental protection

•

Congress should increase the maximum penalties exponentially

•

The detailed recommendations of the Outer Continental Shelf
Safety Oversight Board regarding inspection and enforcement
should be implemented, with additional authority and funding
from Congress as needed

•

Congress should create strong and clear debarment provisions

•

Congress should require that lessees post an assurance bond that
more accurately reflects the risks associated with the exploration
and development process

Inadequate Environmental
Review Processes

Inadequate Penalties and
Assurance Bonds
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Table 1.
Summary of Regulatory Failures and Related Reforms (cont.)
The MMS/
BOEMRE

NEPA

Regulatory Failure (cont.)

Proposed Reform (cont.)

Inadequate Agency Funding

•

The President and Congress should provide adequate funding to
enable BOEMRE to perform necessary regulatory functions and to
hire, train, and retain competent staff

A Captive Agency

•

BOEMRE should implement new ethical standards

•

Congress should increase BOEMRE’s funding to permit reasonably
competitive salaries and adequate training for agency staff

•

To help to clarify and rebalance the agency’s mission and enhance
its authority, Congress should amend the OCSLA to put safety
and the environment on par with energy development; this will
strengthen the agency’s culture and make it more resistant to
external pressures

•

BOEMRE should be further reorganized so that enforcement and
monitoring are conducted independently of planning, leasing,
and exploration and production plan approval and permitting
activities

•

BOEMRE should be further reorganized so that policy
development is conducted independently from other agency
activities; and the President and Congress should provide the
agency with a coherent offshore energy development policy

Failure to Plan for the WorstCase Scenario

•

The CEQ should reinstate the original 1978 regulation requiring a
worst-case analysis

Taking Shortcuts Through
Categorical Exclusions and
Inappropriate Tiering

•

Agencies should document the application of existing categorical
exclusions, including providing supporting analysis for why the
exclusion is not barred by extraordinary circumstances

•

Agencies should ensure adequate public involvement before both
establishing new and applying existing exclusions

•

Agencies should periodically review existing exclusions

•

The CEQ should consider developing regulations that would
require agencies to seek public input and to solicit the views of
federal agencies with relevant expertise before proposing to rely
on a categorical exclusion

•

The CEQ should consider revising its tiering regulations to clarify
the limits of appropriate tiering, so that it is used only to avoid
inefficient repetition of material already covered

Regulatory Blowout: How Regulatory Failures Made the BP Disaster Possible
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Table 1.
Summary of Regulatory Failures and Related Reforms (cont.)
NEPA
(cont.)

The ESA

Regulatory
Design

Energy Policy

Regulatory Failure (cont.)

Proposed Reform (cont.)

Bad Science Undermines
NEPA’s Efficacy

•

Through additional funding and a clear legislative mandate,
Congress should establish the U.S. Geological Survey as an
independent science advisor for BOEMRE on complying with
environmental laws

•

For technical information, Congress should create an advisory
board—independent of both industry and the agency—to review
risk assessments as well as agency safety regulations and standards

Ignoring Low Probability
•
Risks of Catastrophic Harm to
Listed Species
•

BOEMRE should improve its capacity to generate sound scientific
and technical assessments of the risk of drilling
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine
Fisheries Services (the Services) should exercise their authority to
demand that action agencies use all the available information to
supply an analysis of possible outcomes of the proposed action,
and should suspend consultations if this information is not
provided

•

The Services should amend the regulatory definition of “indirect
effects” to include low probability but catastrophic effects

Failure to Aggregate Low
Probability Risks

•

The Services should amend the regulatory definition of
“environmental baseline” to ensure that low probability risks of
harm to listed species are properly aggregated

Failure to Incorporate the
Precautionary Principle into
the Regulatory Process

•

The Precautionary Principle should be reinvigorated and reinstated
into the regulatory process to ensure that environmental, health,
and safety regulations are designed to account for low probability
but catastrophic risks

Subsidizing Unreasonably
Risky Offshore Drilling

•

Congress should identify and eliminate all the various oil
extraction industry tax breaks that have accumulated in the U.S.
tax code

•

Congress should repeal the Deep Water Royalty Relief Act

•

Congress should take action to terminate the errant leases issued
under the Deep Water Royalty Relief Act that allow oil companies
to continue enjoying royalty reductions even though oil prices are
high

•

Congress should repeal the various subsidies provided to the oil
extraction industry in the Energy Policy Act of 2005

Regulatory Blowout: How Regulatory Failures Made the BP Disaster Possible
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Table 1.
Summary of Regulatory Failures and Related Reforms (cont.)
Energy Policy
(cont.)

Lessons from
the North Sea

Regulatory Failure (cont.)

Proposed Reform (cont.)

Ignoring Climate Change
Linkages

•

The United States must place a price on carbon, either through a
carbon tax or through a cap-and-trade regimen, so that all social
costs are incorporated into the price of energy

•

To ensure the effectiveness of carbon pricing, the United States
should eliminate all remaining subsidies for fossil fuels

•

The United States should seek to promote innovations
in alternative energy and energy efficiency, so that these
technologies are able to compete on a level playing field with
fossil fuels in the energy market

•

Congress should require BOEMRE to undertake an ongoing,
systematic evaluation of the lessons learned elsewhere in the
wake of serious offshore oil drilling accidents, and of alternative
regulatory measures and techniques that have proven effective

Ignoring Other Countries’
Experiences with Offshore
Drilling Disasters

Regulatory Blowout: How Regulatory Failures Made the BP Disaster Possible
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Introduction
In the weeks following the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig and the blowout
of the well that BP was drilling in the Gulf of Mexico, the picture that has emerged points
not just to large-scale environmental and economic damage after the explosion, but to
massive failures before the accident in the regulatory systems designed to protect public
health, safety, and the environment. The facts suggest that the disaster and the attendant
human, environmental, and economic loss were entirely preventable, had stronger regulation
and enforcement been in place.
As leaders from across the political spectrum have acknowledged in the wake of the
financial crisis and again in the wake of this oil spill, regulation has an essential role to play in
protecting core American values: human life and health; a healthy and robust environment;
and a thriving economy. We unfortunately now have vivid proof that the economic and
environmental costs of regulatory failure can be far greater than anyone knew and perhaps
even greater than anyone had imagined.
The report begins by laying out the shortcomings in the primary statute under which
deepwater oil drilling is regulated—the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA)—and
outlines key reforms needed to provide the authority necessary to protect the public interest.
It then turns to systemic problems within the agency charged with regulation of deepwater
oil drilling under the OCSLA—the Mineral Management Service (MMS), renamed the
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE) in the
wake of the disaster. These include problems of agency capture and inadequate funding.
The third topic addressed in the report is the role of the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA)—how and why this landmark statute was disabled from performing its critical
role in the case of the BP well, and what regulatory changes can ensure that it functions
effectively in the future.
The report next details the problems that surrounded the implementation and enforcement
of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) as it applied to oil drilling and recommends several
key reforms.
The report then discusses a systemic problem that is a theme in each prior section and
that specific statutory reforms cannot fully remedy: obstacles to making sound regulatory
decisions in the face of uncertain, low probability risks of potentially catastrophic or
irreversible harm. This section highlights a common sense solution: adoption of a
precautionary stance. A precautionary approach would replace the current widely-adopted
presumption that regulation must await a high—and often unattainable—degree of certainty,
even when the potential costs are irreversible or catastrophic.

Regulatory Blowout: How Regulatory Failures Made the BP Disaster Possible
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In the last sections of the report, we step back to look at the regulatory system from a
broader perspective. We consider first how the regulatory system and its failures in this case
were caused in part by the absence of coherent policies on energy and climate change. Our
current policy provides vast incentives for risky oil and gas development like deepwater
drilling and few for low-carbon alternative energy sources. In the wake of yet another
painful lesson on the cost of our current incoherent approach, it is time to focus political
attention on the difficult but necessary task of debating and adopting a coherent and sound
energy policy.
In the final section, we step back geographically to suggest why another lesson of this
disaster is that the United States should undertake to learn more from the experience
abroad, offering the example of the North Sea. Had we been paying closer attention, the
investigations and reforms in the wake of the infamous Piper Alpha spill or the Bravo
platform blowout might have offered insights to help us avoid this disaster.

Regulatory Blowout: How Regulatory Failures Made the BP Disaster Possible
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I. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
(OCSLA)
Legal Context: The Role of the OCSLA in Deepwater Offshore Drilling
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA)1 is the principle statute governing the
development of oil and gas resources on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). In the statute,
Congress charged the Department of the Interior with overseeing the “expeditious and orderly
development [of offshore oil resources], subject to environmental safeguards, in a manner
which is consistent with the maintenance of competition and other national needs . . . .”2 The
OCSLA also directed that operations be conducted “in a safe manner by well-trained personnel
using technology, precautions, and techniques to prevent or minimize the likelihood of
blowouts . . . or other occurrences which may cause damage to the environment or to property,
or endanger life or health.”3 At the time of the Deepwater Horizon blowout, the Minerals
Management Service (MMS), a bureau within the Department of the Interior, had primary
responsibility for implementing the OCSLA; following the blowout, the Bureau of Ocean
Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE), the successor agency to the
MMS, has had implementing authority for the OCSLA.
In offshore oil exploration and drilling, health, safety, and environmental protection are
inextricably intertwined. Some regulations, like those requiring blowout preventers, have the
goal of protecting the safety of both workers and the environment, by preventing dangerous
situations that may cause well blowouts or spills. Others, such as a requirement that the
agency consider the impacts of oil exploration on species that live in the area of proposed
drilling, have a goal of avoiding impacts to the marine or coastal environment and human
health. In this report, we consider the adequacy of both types of protections.
Oil and gas development activities managed under the OCSLA occur in four distinct
stages: (1) development of a five-year leasing plan;4 (2) issuance of oil and gas leases (often
called the lease-sale);5 (3) approval of a lessee’s exploration plan;6 and (4) approval of a
lessee’s development and production plan.7 This four-tiered structure was intended to start
with broad-based planning and then move “to an increasingly narrower focus as actual
development grows more imminent.”8 For a variety of reasons, this statutory framework has
failed to protect public health, safety, and the environment adequately. Key shortcomings are
outlined below, along with recommendations for addressing each.
Regulatory Failures and Proposed Reforms
Regulatory Failure: Inadequate Mandates for Safety and Environmental
Protection

The OCSLA directs the Department of Interior to consider “the potential impact of
oil and gas exploration on other resource values of the outer Continental Shelf and the
Regulatory Blowout: How Regulatory Failures Made the BP Disaster Possible
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marine, coastal, and human environments,”9 and to balance “between the potential for
environmental damage, the potential for the discovery of oil and gas, and the potential for
adverse impact on the coastal zone.”10 The Secretary of the Interior is charged to develop
a leasing program that considers environmental values and impacts. Operations in the OCS
are also to be conducted to promote safety and to prevent blowouts, loss of well control, or
other occurrences “which may cause damage to the environment or property or endanger
life or health.”11
Despite this general language requiring consideration of health, safety, and the environment,
the statute lacks clear enforceable mandates setting forth adequate environmental and
safety standards with which oil and gas drilling activities must comply.12 Instead, the statute
focuses heavily on development of oil and gas resources, providing incidental consideration
of environmental impacts in select provisions. The most specific standards the statute
incorporates provide that the Secretary may cancel a lease or permit if it “would probably
cause serious harm or damage to life (including fish and other aquatic life), to property,
to any mineral (in areas leased or not leased), to the national security or defense, or to the
marine, coastal, or human environment.”13 This provision requires an extremely high level
of proof to trigger protective action, proof that is rarely available, thus making the standard
virtually meaningless. A lease or permit may be cancelled only if it would probably cause
serious harm or damage. A companion provision governing exploration plan approval
requires even greater proof to trigger protection, directing that an exploration plan shall be
approved unless it would result in a similar condition.14
Unlike the Clean Air Act or the Clean Water Act, the OCSLA also sets no baseline about
the kinds of environmental protection and safety technology the agency must require of
lessees. Instead, the agency is given broad discretion to balance competing interests in oil
and gas development, safety, and environmental protection. In consequence, although the
MMS did promulgate detailed and extensive regulations about the safety technology to be
employed, these were based largely on standards recommended and developed by industry.
As has become clear in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon explosion and blowout, these
regulations were far from forcing technological innovation and left the United States and its
citizens with far less protection than is required by other countries.

Although
the MMS did
promulgate
detailed and
extensive
regulations
about the safety
technology to
be employed,
these were
based largely
on standards
recommended
and developed by
industry.

In fact, in 2002, the Coast Guard warned that, unless forced to do so by regulation, oil
producers would not develop new spill response and prevention technologies to match
their rapidly expanding extraction capabilities.15 Nevertheless, the MMS routinely accepted
industry recommendations about the level and kinds of safety technologies and techniques
sufficient to protect the environment. BP’s Deepwater Horizon spill showed how unwise
this approach has been. Instead of requiring that the lessees demonstrate that their safety
technology performed as well as the best available technology, regulators simply accepted
assurances that a blowout was unlikely and adopted industry standards. The absence of
any technology-forcing mandate in the statute meant that industry lacked any incentive to
develop new and better safety technology.
Regulatory Blowout: How Regulatory Failures Made the BP Disaster Possible
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Also lacking under current law is an enforceable standard to ensure that adequate technology
exists to respond to potential spills. The Oil Pollution Act requires that the owner or
operator of a tank vessel or facility “prepare and submit . . . a plan for responding, to the
maximum extent practicable, to a worst case discharge.”16 But, by regulation, the MMS
tethered this responsibility to “the limitations of available technology” and only required
consideration of a worst-case discharge that continues for 30 days.17 Thus, not only is there
no specific performance standard that a lessee must meet, there is also no assessment of
whether the available technology is adequate to protect the environment. This is a regulatory
scheme that encourages stagnation. In fact, it creates a perverse incentive for industry not
to develop newer technologies capable of cleaning up more oil, because doing so increases
industry’s clean-up obligations. Moreover, the MMS regulations authorize operations for
up to two years while a response plan is under agency review, prior to its approval; and, as
the recent report by the OCS Safety Oversight Board noted, oil spill response plans “are
designed to deal with surface oil cleanup, not containment and control of wells at the spill’s
source.”18 These provisions demonstrate the lax attitude towards the serious risks inherent in
oil and gas activities and the need for clear direction from Congress to change this approach.
As the experience with the BP oil spill revealed, in practice, development of oil and gas has
been allowed to go forward at the expense of both safety and environmental protection.
This will remain the status quo so long as there is a lack of strong enforceable mandates
for protection of the environment and safety to govern planning, leasing, exploration,
production, and spill response actions.
Proposed Reform: Adopt Strong Mandates for Environmental Protection and
Safety and Create Incentives for Continual Safety Innovation

To protect the public’s interest in safe and environmentally sound oil production, Congress
should provide BOEMRE with more explicit direction about how to strike the balance
between oil production, safety, and environmental protection. Throughout the OCSLA,
consideration of the environment and safety should be incorporated alongside energy
production, as a goal, policy, and mandate. The statements of policy in the OCSLA should
be clarified so that oil exploration and development will be permitted only where it can
occur without posing a significant risk to public health, safety, and the environment. The
goals of the statute should include managing offshore oil and gas exploration, development,
and extraction in a fashion that best protects public health, safety, and the marine and coastal
environments while helping to meet national energy needs. Exploration, development, and
production should occur only when these activities can be done in a manner that protects
life, health, the coastal and marine environment, sea life (including fish, marine mammals,
coral, and other species), property, and other uses of the seabed, subsoil, and water.
In addition to strengthening the policy of the OCSLA, Congress should incorporate clear
substantive mandates for safety and environmental protection at each of the OCSLA’s fourstage development process. These provisions should implement the policies outlined above,
Regulatory Blowout: How Regulatory Failures Made the BP Disaster Possible
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by requiring agency decision-makers to ensure that OCS oil and gas development does not
pose a risk of significant harm to safety, health, or the environment, and that it minimizes
possible impacts on marine and coastal environments before approving plans, leases, or
other activity. This would replace current language that merely directs the agency to consider
such impacts at various points in the statute.
Congress should also amend the OCSLA to incorporate a clear technology-forcing
standard, such as best available technology, defining clearly as it has in other statutes what
that standard means. It is clear that existing regulations have not been adequate to ensure
safety and environmental protection. At a minimum, Congress should direct BOEMRE
to thoroughly review existing safety requirements and adopt new requirements for key
safety technology, including but not limited to blowout preventers. Congress may wish
to specify some of the contours of the new safety requirements, based on the extensive
technical information that has emerged in various congressional hearings on the subject as
well as the anticipated report of the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon
Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. However, Congress should also direct BOEMRE to revisit
existing regulations in light of these investigations, to adopt new standards that represent
the best available technology, and to update these standards on a regular basis to ensure
their adequacy. Given the overall inadequacy of the safety and environmental measures
under current law, it would be a mistake to focus only on addressing the shortcomings that
contributed directly to the BP blowout. A comprehensive review is needed to anticipate
and prevent other types of foreseeable disasters, and routine ongoing review is essential to
avoid regulatory stagnation in the future. A stronger mandate and better funding for agency
research on safety will be necessary to support such a program.
In addition, Congress should condition the agency’s authority to approve exploration
and development plans on the submission by industry of adequate data and analysis to
demonstrate the safety of the proposed activity and the adequacy of the spill response plan.
Congress should also remove the perverse disincentive for development of better clean-up
technologies by directing BOEMRE to set federal spill response performance standards.
In doing so, Congress should require that the agency specify two distinct aspects of
the required spill response capacity: 1) the level of spill response capacity that must be
demonstrated, and 2) the level of certainty that the identified technologies can actually
achieve that result.
With regard to the level of spill response capacity, Congress should direct the agency to set
spill response standards that are based on expert assessments of the level of spill mitigation
necessary to avert negative environmental impacts should a worst-case spill occur. Lessees
should be required to demonstrate that their equipment and procedures are capable of
meeting these standards, and that the necessary equipment and personnel are available to
respond to an occurrence. Those bidding on leases should be required to demonstrate that
they meet these standards as a pre-requisite for eligibility. This obligation should include
the requirement that response technologies and practices be proven effective under siteRegulatory Blowout: How Regulatory Failures Made the BP Disaster Possible
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specific conditions, and should include same-season relief well capabilities (an issue of
particular concern in the Arctic.). Where no technologies or operation techniques exist
to protect against a known, significant risk, approval to proceed should be withheld until
such technologies or techniques are developed. Such an approach builds into the statute
an incentive for continual innovation in developing and improving new spill response
technologies.
Finally, Congress should direct BOEMRE to study accident investigation, information
collection, and dissemination procedures employed in other high risk industries that involve
complex systems, such as airlines and nuclear energy, and to develop a program that
maximizes the opportunity for continuous learning and improvement. The recent report
by the OCS Safety Oversight Board began this task by comparing BOEMRE post-accident
investigation protocol with several relevant agencies, a foundation on which the agency
should continue to build.19 Effective analysis and dissemination of accident or incident
information can provide both industry and regulators with the opportunity to observe
patterns and to develop effective responses. This can help to avert further accidents by
warning of equipment or human error risks and could provide regulators information on
patterns involving repeat players that warrant stepped up monitoring or enforcement.
Regulatory Failure: Inadequate Environmental Review Processes

In addition to the lack of a clear and enforceable mandate for protection of the
environment, the four-stage planning-leasing-exploration-development process poses
inherent challenges for incorporating meaningful environmental review. At present, the
statute does not clearly require environmental consideration at every stage. The statute
contemplates environmental review in preparation of the five-year plan, and historically this
has been the stage that has received the greatest attention.20 To be sure, critical decisions
with important environmental consequences are made at this stage, such as what areas will
be open to leasing and on what schedule. However, planning may cover a vast area—tens of
millions of acres. Therefore, the environmental data and assessment that can be done at that
stage is necessarily somewhat general.
Currently, the OCSLA is silent on consideration of environmental impacts at the second
stage of the process—namely, leasing—even though this stage provides one of the most
critical opportunities for environmental assessments. Although the MMS regulations
require consideration of all available environmental information in deciding to conduct lease
sales and direct the MMS to “evaluate fully the potential effect of leasing on the human,
marine and coastal environments” and to develop mitigation measures,21 and although an
environmental review is performed at this stage under NEPA, it is unclear whether any new
information is generated or whether the agency merely assesses the very general information
already prepared as part of the planning process. The environmental assessment for the
lease area that included the BP well contains very little by way of new information. Instead,
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it repeatedly refers back to the analysis of environmental impacts found in a multi-sale
environmental impact statement and then offers a summary of it.22
Moreover, at the lease-sale stage, the MMS routinely designated lease-sale areas without
seeking input from agencies with specialized expertise in managing marine resources
and marine safety, like the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the Coast Guard. Nor is the agency required to
amend a proposed lease sale in light of interagency objections. The result is that decisions
are made without adequate consideration of their impacts on marine and coastal ecosystems.
Assessment at this stage is extremely important. It is at this stage that the agency can
perhaps best identify critical areas and resources that should be excluded from leasing because
of their environmental or economic values. It is important that the agency be required
to consult with other relevant agencies at this stage and respond to their objections, and
that it be provided the authority to exclude important ecological areas from oil and gas
development activity and to require measures to preserve their integrity.
There are financial reasons why consideration of environmental values at the leasing
stage is important under current law, and why subsequent decisions on exploration and
development plans do not offer an appropriate opportunity to assess whether the area of
proposed activity has environmental or economic attributes that are too valuable to expose
to the inherently risky operations associated with oil development. Specifically, by the time
it develops exploration or development plans, the lessee may be entitled to compensation
if the Secretary cancels a lease or permit for site-specific environmental reasons.23 This has
provided the MMS with a strong incentive to ignore or downplay significant environmental
concerns that emerge at the exploration or development stages of the OCSLA’s development
process.

Under the OSCLA,
the MMS has
only 30 days in
which to approve
or disapprove
an exploration
plan and
accompanying
documents
such as the spill
response plan.

The MMS regulations developed pursuant to the OCSLA currently require submission of
some environmental data and analysis at the exploration and development and production
stages, but the requirements lack specificity.24 Environmental assessment at the exploration
and development stages is the best opportunity to focus on specific impacts of the precise
plan of exploration or development proposed. Yet, the environmental data and analysis
that MMS has accepted at even this stage has been exceedingly general and in some cases
generic.25
Moreover, even if adequate environmental information and analysis accompanied the
exploration plan, under the OCSLA, the agency has only 30 days in which to approve or
disapprove an exploration plan and accompanying documents such as the spill response
plan.26 Thirty days is not enough time to adequately assess the environmental impacts of
an exploration plan. The agency is forced by this artificially short deadline to make critical
decisions without due consideration. The short time line, coupled with the statutory
compensation requirement, mean that in the end there is rarely any serious consideration of
site-specific environmental concerns, or of cumulative effects of multiple leases.
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Indeed, after BP’s Deepwater Horizon spill, it became clear that BP’s Regional Oil Spill
Response Plan for the Gulf,27 and its site-specific plan for the Deepwater Horizon rig
were riddled with omissions and glaring errors. For example, the plan identified sea lions,
sea otters, and Pacific Walrus as sensitive biological resources despite the fact that these
animals are not found in the Gulf of Mexico. (Obviously, significant portions of the Gulf
response plan had been cut-and-pasted from a response plan for development activities
in Alaskan waters.) The documents also included phone numbers for long-dead experts,
and incorrect Internet addresses. Plans submitted by other Gulf drillers, all of which
had been prepared by the same consultant, contained identical errors. It is clear that oil
companies had simply been going through the motions of environmental planning, creating
meaningless documents crammed with recycled and inaccurate information rather than
considered response plans tailored to the Gulf. Given the short deadline imposed on
agency environmental review by the OCSLA, industry no doubt knew it would be virtually
impossible for the MMS to give these plans any careful scrutiny.
Proposed Reform: Overhaul Environmental Review Procedures, Require
Agency Consultation, and Extend Deadlines

Establishing procedures for environmental review at each step of the OCSLA’s four-stage
decision-making process is a substantial undertaking. Determining the type of review
appropriate to each stage of the oil and gas development process involves many technical
questions about scale, data availability, and appropriate analytic methods, among other issues.
To assist BOEMRE in addressing these questions, Congress should consider convening a
panel of independent experts, following the model of the highly successful Committee of
Experts convened pursuant to the National Forest Management Act.28 The Committee
would be charged to assist BOEMRE in the development of detailed regulations outlining
the environmental data to be submitted at each stage and the appropriate environmental
review to be undertaken by the agency at each stage, to ensure compliance with the new
environmental mandates.
Congress should also amend the OCSLA to establish a consultation requirement, thereby
ensuring that BOEMRE draws on the relevant expertise of other federal agencies. In this
way, interagency consultation would become a critical part of the planning and approval
processes. Congress should designate other agencies with relevant expertise, including
the Coast Guard, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the FWS, and NOAA, as
cooperating agencies29 for the purposes of all environmental analyses associated with the
planning and leasing process. In addition, Congress should amend the statute to require a
public comment period before any exploration plan is approved. These changes will ensure
that a variety of views are considered during the planning and approval processes, and will
increase the transparency and accountability of this process.
Congress should remove time limits for the Department of the Interior to rule on
exploration plans or, at the very least, should extend those time limits considerably. This
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is essential to allow BOEMRE to conduct thorough analyses of potential environmental
impacts of proposed oil and gas development activities. They will also provide BOEMRE
with adequate time to assess an oil company’s proposed response plan to ensure that it
is sufficient for minimizing environmental harms in the event that a blowout or other
technological catastrophe occurs.
Finally, the burden of environmentally sound planning must rest squarely on the lessee.
Along with the new environmental and safety standards, the statute should be clarified
to ensure that compensation is not required when the agency denies permits or plans for
failure to comply with statutory or regulatory requirements, including standards for safety or
environmental protection.
Regulatory Failure: Inadequate Penalties and Assurance Bonds

The information that has emerged in the months since the blowout has made clear that
industry has operated in a climate in which costs were routinely balanced against safety and
environmental protection. Compliance with regulatory standards was far from consistent,
and the threat of enforcement was not a meaningful deterrent. Beyond the problems
associated with the culture and funding of the MMS, discussed below, several provisions in
the statute helped to allow this climate to develop.
The OCSLA contains clear enforcement authority for the agency to seek civil and criminal
penalties as well as injunctive relief, and it also authorizes enforcement through citizen suits.
Furthermore, the OCSLA provides for specific liability for corporate officers and agents.
All of these are important tools. However, the fines authorized by the statute are grossly
inadequate and undermine any deterrent effect of the enforcement provisions. In light
of the vast profits associated with oil and gas development, the maximum civil penalty of
$35,000 a day, and even the criminal penalty of $100,000 per day are trivial sums. Indeed,
industry has treated these civil penalties, on the odd occasion when they were imposed,
as merely a cost of doing business. The recent report by the OCS Safety Oversight Board
reveals other constraints that impede the efficacy of inspection and enforcement that
warrant follow-up as well.30
Assurance bonding requirements under the OCSLA are intended to assure that businesses
undertaking oil and gas development activities can cover the costs associated with their
activities. The scale of the damage caused by the BP oil spill demonstrates how vast these
damages can be. It is unlikely that even BP’s post-hoc commitment of $20 billion to cover
claims will be adequate to cover the losses. At present, assurance bonding requirements are
far from assuring anything—current regulations require a bond of only $200,000 at the time
of submitting an exploration plan.31
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Proposed Reform: Increase Penalty and Bonding Amounts and Provide for
Debarment of Serious Violators

To deter lax compliance with health, safety, and environmental regulations, Congress should
increase the maximum penalties exponentially. The detailed recommendations of the OCS
Safety Oversight Board regarding inspection and enforcement should be implemented, with
additional authority and funding from Congress as needed.32 In addition, Congress should
create strong and clear debarment provisions. Such measures should preclude entities
with serious outstanding safety or environmental violations from bidding on new leases or
obtaining further permits for new exploration or development activities. Congress should
also include a more severe bar that would exclude companies from participating in oil and
gas activities on the OCS for a period of years based upon a finding of a pattern of serious
violations of safety or environmental standards.
Congress should also require that lessees post an assurance bond that more accurately
reflects the risks associated with the exploration and development process. By requiring
lessees to post meaningful bonds before any drilling commences, Congress would ensure
lessees thoroughly assess the risks associated with their proposed activities, including any
worst-case scenarios, before any drilling occurs. Such a requirement would create an upfront
price tag associated with riskier drilling plans. This, in turn, would create a further incentive
for companies to reduce their risk (and thereby their assurance bond costs) by following the
safest plan and by developing new safety technologies and spill response capabilities.
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II. The Minerals Management Service (MMS)
Legal Context: The Role of the MMS and the New Bureau of Ocean
Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE)
The prior section focuses on limitations of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
(OCSLA), the statute that should have prevented the well blowout and explosion of
the Deepwater Horizon. But, in addition to shortcomings with the statute itself, severe
problems within the agency charged with implementing the OCSLA contributed to the
disaster. The shortcomings of the Minerals Management Service (MMS) are vast and deep
and it is abundantly clear that reforms are needed to address the problems that plagued the
agency. They have been the subject of extensive investigation by Congress, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), the Department of the Interior Inspector General’s Office,
and most recently, the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Safety Oversight Board.
The Department of the Interior has already taken a number of steps to try to address the
problems, including replacing the MMS’s Director and restructuring the agency to create
separate programs that divide the leasing, safety, and enforcement functions from the
revenue collection functions. In the process, the agency has been renamed the Bureau of
Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE), to emphasize a new
focus on alternative ocean-based energy technologies, such as wind.33 Moreover, internal
reforms to eliminate the royalty-in-kind program and remedy failures in collection of
royalties had already begun before the Deepwater Horizon explosion. This report highlights
areas of particular concern that persist notwithstanding these steps and recommends priority
reforms to address these.
Regulatory Failures and Proposed Reforms
Regulatory Failure: Inadequate Agency Funding

There is little argument that both regulatory and response agencies involved in the BP
disaster lacked adequate resources to perform effectively. At the time of the BP explosion
and well blowout, the MMS regulated about 3,795 offshore production platforms and
managed about 8,124 active oil and gas leases on approximately 43 million acres of the
Outer Continental Shelf (OCS).34 In the last 10 years, the operations the MMS regulated
have undergone rapid technological change and have increasingly shifted to deepwater and
ultra deepwater environments,35 a change that has increased the level and complexity of
monitoring and the time needed for permit and plan reviews and inspections of operations.36
In its 2006 budget request justification, the MMS noted:
New technologies involved in the projects will continually challenge MMS.
For example, industry has developed and installed several new types of spar
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production facilities, each requiring a structural soundness review by MMS.
It is likely that additional new types of approaches will be developed and
need review.37
Yet, during this period, the MMS’s budget has remained relatively flat.38 Staffing of the MMS
has similarly remained stable at best, with some reductions.39 As Representative Bart Stupak
noted in a recent statement:
The number of producing deepwater wells increased from 65 in the [sic] 1985
to more than 600 in 2009. But the number of federal inspectors working for
Minerals Management Service (MMS) has not kept pace with the number
and complexity of wells and the distance inspectors must travel. MMS had
55 inspectors in 1985 and just 58 some 20 years later. Currently, MMS has
approximately 60 inspectors in the Gulf of Mexico region to inspect almost
4,000 facilities. Inspection has not been a priority.40
Acting Department of the Interior Inspector General Mary Kendall, while testifying before
the House Committee on Natural Resources, compared the 60 inspectors for the almost
4,000 facilities in the Gulf of Mexico region with the Pacific Coast, which has 10 inspectors
for only 23 facilities.41 In its 2011 budget request, the MMS finally requested six additional
inspectors for the Gulf of Mexico region,42 and, in the wake of the spill, the Department of
the Interior hired twice that many new inspectors, implicitly acknowledging the inadequacy
of even the originally proposed increases.
Acting Inspector General Kendall also noted the difficulty the MMS faces in recruiting
inspectors because of the considerably higher wages and bonuses offered by industry.
Moreover, she noted:
[I]nspectors for MMS receive primarily on-the-job training. The MMS Offshore Inspector Training program guidance and instructions appear to be
considerably out of date, developed between 1984 and 1991, and credit individuals with industry experience. During our investigative efforts, we have
found indications that inspector training and training programs have not kept
pace with the technological advancements occurring within the industry.43
The GAO has expressed similar concerns regarding the MMS’s ability to recruit and train
well-qualified staff:
Agencies should have sufficient staff with the technical expertise to oversee
the activities under their authority. Oil and gas production methods on federal lands and waters have become increasingly sophisticated over the past
decade. Additionally, oil and gas companies now rely on information technology to manage and oversee their operations. In a March 2010 review, we
found that Interior had challenges in hiring, training, and retaining staff in
critical oil and gas oversight roles, leading to questions about the technical
capacity of Interior staff overseeing oil and gas activities.44
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These and other similar revelations from the recent congressional investigations as well as
the agency’s own investigations and statements, including the recent OCS Safety Oversight
Board Report, have made abundantly clear that the MMS lacked the resources and expertise
it needed to effectively develop, implement, and enforce regulations for the complex, highly
sophisticated, and rapidly changing technology employed in deepwater and ultra deepwater
drilling. Instead, it has relied heavily on industry to self-monitor,45 the disastrous results of
which are now clear.
Proposed Reform: Provide Adequate Funding to Enable BOEMRE to
Perform Necessary Regulatory Functions and to Hire, Train, and
Retain Competent Staff

Without adequate funding, the agency cannot accomplish the important functions that have
been assigned to it—to plan for and regulate oil drilling activities on the OCS and to monitor
and enforce so as to protect public health, safety, and the environment. The President
and Congress respectively need to develop a budget for and fund BOEMRE based on its
mandates and mission, including any responsibilities clarified or created in new legislation.
A budget approach based on authorizing only incremental increases from the inadequate
funding levels of the predecessor agency would doom the new agency to failure. Substantial
new funding is needed for research and development, regulatory development, staff salaries
and training, and monitoring and enforcement. These will enable the new agency to stay
ahead of new technology; develop safety regulations rather than following industry’s lead;
hire, train, and retain capable staff; and monitor and enforce effectively.
The Obama Administration has taken small but positive steps to increase funding for
BOEMRE. In May of 2010, President Obama secured a supplemental appropriation for
the MMS of $29 million to hire additional inspectors, step up enforcement, and thoroughly
review agency policies in the wake of the Department of the Interior’s 30-day report on
the safety of the offshore drilling program.46 While the President and Congress responded
quickly in the glare of the publicity from the disaster, experience suggests that once media
attention has turned elsewhere, small government/lower tax ideologues of the right will
oppose reasonable and indeed essential increases in the budget of the MMS’s successor
agency. Yet, the recent modest allocations of additional funding merely represent a small
down payment on the resources BOEMRE needs if it is to responsibly monitor and
enforce health, safety, and environmental standards for the more than 8,000 wells in the
OCS alone—much less perform additional functions consistent with the vision for the new
agency, which includes a vastly expanded emphasis on renewable ocean energy resources.47
Regulatory Failure: A Captive Agency

In order to protect and advance the public’s interest, government must be responsive to the
voters through the democratic process and able to act independently in the public interest.
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The history of the MMS reveals the dangers of a regulatory agency that identifies strongly
with corporate interests and lacks accountability. The MMS is a regrettably apt illustration
of the captive agency theory of administrative agencies.48 This theory postulates that federal
agencies have a tendency to move so far in the direction of accommodating the interests of
the entities they are charged with regulating that ultimately those agencies may fairly be seen
as a “captive” of the regulated companies.49 Captive agency theory typically views regulators
as subject to unique pressures and influences that can push their actions and policies in a
direction favored by regulated firms. Among other things, the theory posits that captive
agencies tend to be unduly passive, ponderous, and inefficient, failing to enforce regulatory
requirements with needed vigor and enthusiasm. The MMS’s inattentive, if not disdainful,
implementation of safety and environmental requirements, its reliance on industry to
develop standards, and its lax monitoring and enforcement all bespeak a captive agency.

The MMS is
a regrettably
apt illustration
of the captive
agency theory
of administrative
agencies.

One needn’t look far to see the influence that industry had acquired. Indeed, the very culture
of the MMS had become corrupted by close connections with industry and identification of
the agency staff with the interests of the industry, as a series of GAO reports and the recent
reports by the Department of the Interior Inspector General and OCS Safety Oversight
Board have amply documented.50 The MMS had developed so pervasive a culture of
deference to and identity with corporate interests that agency staff failed even to recognize
unethical, inappropriate, and unlawful behavior in many cases. The culture documented in
various investigations and reports included inappropriate relationships between staff and
members of the industry, widespread socializing, acceptance of impermissible or unreported
gifts from oil and gas companies that the agency was charged with regulating, and a revolving
door that appeared to impair agency staff ’s objectivity and zeal for enforcement.51
Commenting on the cozy relationship between the agency and industry, an MMS District
Manager told an investigator with the Department of the Interior Inspector General’s office:
Obviously, we’re all oil industry…. We’re all from the same part of the country. Almost all of our inspectors have worked for oil companies out on these
same platforms. They grew up in the same towns. Some of these people,
they’ve been friends with all their life. They’ve been with these people since
they were kids. They’ve hunted together. They fish together. They skeet
shoot together . . . . They do this all the time.52
Conditions that fostered this unhealthy relationship and allowed it to prosper have roots
deeper than inadequate ethics training or the failure of individual personnel to follow rules
and policies. Most basically, the MMS’s mandate was skewed to advance development of
energy resources with insufficient attention to health, safety, and the environment, thereby
encouraging this identification of the agency with the industry. In addition, the agency was
structured without any measures to ensure that those officials charged with permitting and
enforcement were completely independent of those charged with collecting revenue for the
government from oil and gas operations, thus creating a potential conflict of interests.53
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Exacerbating this structural flaw, in 1993, the MMS was granted authority to rely on
offsetting collections from revenues it collected to fund the discretionary portion of
its budget. Since 1998, this has become a significant source of funding for the agency,
comprising from 40 to 50 percent of its discretionary budget in most years. As pressure to
reduce agency budgets has grown, the MMS has thus become more dependent on drilling
in order to fulfill its protective functions, a clear conflict.54 At the staff level, the recent
OCS Safety Oversight Board Report noted that employee performance plans and monetary
awards may be tied to meeting deadlines for approving leases or development plans,
incentives that could create a clear conflict of interest for staff.55
In addition to these structural and financial incentives, the MMS’s inadequate level of
funding, as discussed above, made the agency dependent on industry expertise to aid it in
developing regulatory standards and made industry the primary training ground for agency
staff. This, in turn, contributed to the revolving door between the agency and industry.
Acting Department of the Interior Inspector General Mary Kendall highlighted this concern
in submitting her report to Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar: “Of greatest concern to
me is the environment in which these inspectors operate—particularly the ease with which
they move between industry and government.”56 Similarly, a GAO report observed:
[K]ey technical positions responsible for oversight of oil and gas activities
have experienced high turnover rates, which, according to Interior officials,
impede these employees’ capacity to oversee oil and gas activities. These
positions included petroleum engineers, who process drilling permits and
review oil and gas metering systems, and inspection staff—including BLM’s
petroleum engineer technicians and production accountability technicians
onshore—who conduct drilling, safety and oil and gas production verification inspections.57
Even beyond engineering jobs with industry, many former MMS employees and federal
legislators have gone on to serve as oil and gas industry lobbyists.58
In the wake of the BP well blowout, President Obama noted how this corrosive power
dynamic led to lax regulation and enforcement. “What’s also been made clear from this
disaster is that for years the oil and gas industry has leveraged such power that they have
effectively been allowed to regulate themselves.”59 The anti-regulatory culture is apparent in
statements from the agency’s own 2006 budget justification:
The OMM [Offshore Minerals Management] regulatory program emphasizes performance results rather than strict conformance to prescriptive regulations. It clarifies and simplifies government requirements, and promotes a
greater reliance on industry standards. The MMS is increasing its focus on
finding ways to provide strong incentives for good performance while preventing those operators with poor records from participating.60
Tyler Priest, clinical professor of business history and director of global studies at the
University of Houston’s C.T. Bauer College of Business, and a member of the MMS’s OCS
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Scientific Advisory Committee describes the dynamic in this way: “MMS workers often rely
on the offshore industry for the technical knowledge to do their jobs. In that respect, the
agency is a sort of junior partner to the industry and prone to accepting its preference for
self-regulation.”61 Thus, due to the revolving door problem and cozy industry-regulator
relationship, even the regulations that are adopted are not uniformly enforced.62
Proposed Reform: Implement New Ethics Standards, End the Revolving Door,
and Create a Culture that Supports the Agency’s Regulatory Mission

Secretary Salazar and Director Michael Bromwich, the head of BOEMRE, have repeatedly
emphasized their commitment to clarifying and enforcing ethical standards for BOEMRE
staff, to ensure that the egregious pattern of violations does not continue. This is an
important commitment that should help to change the culture within the new agency and
may require regulatory or legislative measures to ensure its permanence. But, stronger
steps are needed to end the revolving door and ensure that employment at BOEMRE is a
dignified and realistic alternative to private sector employment, and not merely a stepping
stone to a lucrative career “in industry.” Increased funding to permit reasonably competitive
salaries and adequate training for agency staff is a necessary component. While movement
between industry and the agency should not be prohibited, strong legislative provisions to
ensure the independence and absence of conflicts of interest of BOEMRE staff during
their entire tenure at the agency are important.
The reforms to the OCSLA outlined above—placing safety and environmental protection on
a par with oil and gas development, and strengthening the agency’s enforcement powers—
would represent another strong step, since they would help to clarify and rebalance the
agency’s mission and enhance its authority. This in turn would create a better foundation
for building an agency culture that respects the role of regulation. Building such a culture
is essential but is not something that can be accomplished solely through legislation or
regulation. It will also require skillful managerial steps by Director Bromwich. The report
by the OCS Safety Oversight Board is a promising sign. This report, based on extensive
surveys of BOEMRE personnel and other research, confirms the existence of the serious
problems outlined above and provides detailed recommendations that merit serious
attention.63
Proposed Reform: Reorganize the Agency and Separate Its Key Functions

The reorganization of the new agency that is being implemented—separating royalty
collection and resource leasing functions into two separate programs—is another positive
step. However, the ongoing reorganization fails to address several fundamental conflicts that
remain and may undermine the effort to establish a culture that values the role of regulation.
There are at least six distinct functions that BOEMRE performs, some of which should
not be undertaken by a single entity. These functions are policy development; planning
and leasing; research; plan approval and permitting; royalty collection and management;
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and enforcement. Royalty collection and management must be separated from the other
functions, and the current reorganization properly assigns these to a separate program within
the agency. Furthermore, in light of the culture of the agency and industry, enforcement
and monitoring should be conducted independently of planning, leasing, and exploration
and production plan approval and permitting activities.
Another key function that is often overlooked is policy development, a function that is
currently performed to some extent under the rubric of planning and leasing. Under
current law, BOEMRE is charged with developing a five-year offshore leasing plan and then
with proposing specific lease sales consistent with the five-year plan. These actions form
an important part of our national policy on offshore oil and gas development, identifying
what areas to open for drilling and at what pace. The President and Congress can and do
step in to remove or open certain areas or to specify other goals, but neither the President
nor Congress has established a clear national policy for offshore oil and gas development.
Therefore, the agency, by default, is charged with developing an important component of
our national energy policy with little guidance or oversight.
While BOEMRE’s broad discretion leaves it free to pursue any of a wide range of policies
on development, it currently faces strong incentives to pursue a policy that heavily promotes
offshore oil and gas development. Particularly in the absence of clear policy guidance,
the agency is likely to and has in fact become strongly identified with the industry, thus
becoming a promoter of development. Such a role is clearly inconsistent with other
responsibilities, such as permitting and exploration and production plan approval. The
President and Congress should recognize the overriding importance of policy development
in this area and ensure that BOEMRE is not allowed to develop policy in the course of its
plan development.
Indeed, unless BOEMRE is provided with a clear policy to guide its development of oil
and gas leasing plans, the agency may be destined to experience the conflicts that bedeviled
the MMS. Without that check, it seems inevitable that the agency will assume the role of
“promoter” of oil and gas development, to some extent, as well as regulator of OCS oil and
gas development activities. A similar conflict within the Atomic Energy Commission led to
the creation of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to serve as a separate permitting and
regulatory agency for nuclear power, while the role of policy development was assigned to
the Department of Energy. Such a split may be similarly necessary here.
The President and Congress must also work together to develop a coherent offshore energy
development policy. Absent such a policy, BOEMRE will likely develop some of the same
captive agency characteristics that the MMS displayed. Moreover, a meaningful and sound
policy on offshore oil and gas development can only be developed in the context of a
broader national energy policy. Section VI below describes in greater detail the importance
of developing a coherent energy policy and how the lack of such a policy contributed to this
disaster in other ways.

Regulatory Blowout: How Regulatory Failures Made the BP Disaster Possible

Page 28

Center for Progressive Reform

III. The National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA)
Legal Context: The Role of NEPA in Deepwater Offshore Drilling
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) was the first environmental statute of the
modern era. The goal of NEPA is to require federal agencies to engage in a detailed and
careful review of major actions that they propose—from the building of dams and highways
to the issuance of permits and leases—before those proposed actions take place.
NEPA’s key action-forcing provision is subsection 102(2)(C), the Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) requirement. This subsection mandates that for every “major federal action
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment” the federal agency involved
must prepare a detailed public statement, commonly known as an EIS. This statement must
include:
•

Information on the impact of the proposed action, alternatives to it, and any adverse effects which cannot be avoided if the action is implemented;

•

The relation between short-term environmental uses and long-term productivity;
and

•

Any irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources that would be involved
in the proposed action should it be implemented.64

NEPA also established a Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) in the Executive Branch,
and authorized the CEQ to develop regulations for implementing NEPA’s requirements.65
In 1978, the CEQ finalized a set of binding NEPA regulations. These regulations require
each federal agency to prepare its own procedures for complying with NEPA consistent
with that agency’s particular mission. Federal agencies are required to identify and establish
criteria for distinguishing three categories of agency actions: 1) actions that are categorically
excluded from further NEPA review because they do not individually or cumulatively
have a significant effect on the environment; 2) actions that require preparation of an EIS,
because they will have a significant effect on the environment; and 3) actions that call for
the preparation of an Environmental Assessment (EA) to permit the agency to determine
whether a full EIS must be prepared. For actions in the third category, the agency must then
decide whether a full EIS is required or whether the action will have no significant effects,
in which case a “Finding of No Significant Impact” must be prepared, explaining why the
action will not have a significant effect on the environment.66
As described in Section I, deepwater offshore drilling activities, such as those that involved
the Deepwater Horizon disaster, are regulated under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act (OCSLA). Pursuant to the OCSLA, the agency charged with implementing the
statute undertakes actions that include preparation of a nationwide five-year oil and gas
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development plan, specific lease sales, approval of exploration plans, and approval of
development and production plans. Each of these steps constitutes an agency action subject
to NEPA review.
At the time that decisions relating to BP’s Macondo well were undergoing review, the
Minerals Management Service (MMS) was the agency charged with implementing the
OCSLA, and thus with ensuring that the required NEPA reviews were carried out properly
at each stage. In April of 2007, the MMS released a “programmatic EIS” that purported
to analyze the potential region-wide environmental impacts associated with the 20072012 Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program.67 Also in April of 2007, the
MMS released a final “Multisale EIS” that covered eleven lease sales in the Central and
Western Planning Areas of the Gulf of Mexico, an area covering 80 million square acres
that included the site of BP’s Macondo well. In October of 2007, the MMS filed an EA
for Lease Sale 206. This EA included a Finding of No Significant Impact. The EA relied
almost entirely on the analysis performed in the Multisale EIS. Because it concluded that no
new information could be found, the MMS did not perform any new analysis and found no
need to prepare a Supplemental EIS. In April of 2009, the MMS approved BP’s exploration
plan for the Deepwater Horizon project without any environmental review. In its approval,
the MMS stated that the drilling operation should be categorically excluded from NEPA
because the danger of an oil blowout, and any resulting environmental damage, was minimal
or non-existent.
We describe three major deficiencies in the implementation of NEPA below, and how they
ultimately contributed to the BP oil spill. We also provide recommendations for reform in
each of these areas.
Regulatory Failures and Proposed Reforms
Regulatory Failure: Failure to Plan for the Worst-Case Scenario

To promote full disclosure by project proponents and meaningful scrutiny by decisionmakers and the public, the 1978 NEPA regulations issued by the CEQ required federal
agencies to include a worst-case analysis (WCA), along with a discussion of the probability
of its occurrence, in their EISs.68 A WCA was not required for every proposed major federal
action, but only when important information regarding the potential consequences of the
action was unknown or missing. The regulation was a reasonable and even necessary means
of dealing with uncertainty—it forced the federal agency to consider the severity and risk of
possible catastrophic environmental effects, and to balance the need for the action against
that risk. Rather than jumping blindly into the unknown, industries and agencies alike had to
face the uncertainties related to their proposals, reveal those uncertainties to the public, and
consider scenarios involving low probability but high impact events that might occur during
the life of a project.
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Including a WCA is an effective way to screen a proposed action and fill in uncertainties
or gaps in existing data to ensure that potential defects, deficiencies, and consequences are
identified and eliminated prior to implementation. In business, computing, and engineering,
a WCA is used to help companies ensure reliable, stable operations throughout the entire life
cycle of a product, device, or system under the most unfavorable combination of anticipated
conditions. Similarly, in agency planning, performing a WCA during early design stages
can dramatically decrease the risk of economic and environmental disasters, thereby saving
human lives plus millions of dollars in environmental damages and lost revenues.
Despite its importance, the CEQ rescinded the WCA requirement in 1986 and replaced it
with a new, watered-down regulation. The CEQ defended its change of heart by arguing
that the WCA requirement called for mere conjecture, and therefore it was ineffective
as a decision-making tool. Moreover, the CEQ posited that including a WCA in NEPA
analyses was too “sensational” and would mislead the public with “endless hypothesis and
speculation.”69
Contrary to the CEQ’s proffered rationale for the 1986 regulation, it is the failure to disclose
and analyze all of a project’s potential environmental effects—especially in the face of
uncertainty—that is misleading. Without the benefit of a WCA, it is impossible for the
public and the federal agency to assess the true costs and risks of a project, and it is equally
impossible for the agency and the regulated industry to prepare effectively for disaster
through appropriate emergency response plans and other measures. Moreover, the inclusion
of a WCA in an EIS can benefit the decision-making process in other ways, by highlighting
opportunities for mitigation and by stimulating ongoing monitoring of potential trouble
spots during the life of the project.
In the case of the BP Deepwater Horizon rig, the industry and the agency failed to consider
the “devastating sequence of equipment failures” that was clearly foreseeable but thought
to be unlikely.70 BP’s own exploration plan, approved by the MMS in 2009, minimized
the danger of a spill: “[I]t is unlikely that an accidental oil spill release would occur from
the proposed activities.” Although BP acknowledged that a spill could impact wetlands
and beaches, it dismissed the significance by stating that, “due to the distance to shore (48
miles) and the response capabilities that would be implemented, no significant adverse
impacts are expected.”71 The agency’s assessment of the likelihood of a blowout or massive
spill reflected these same assumptions, repeatedly describing these events as unlikely and
therefore dismissing them with little or no analysis of their impacts. A proper WCA would
have required BP and the MMS to consider and plan for these exigencies.
Proposed Reform: Reinstate the Regulatory Requirement of a WCA

The CEQ should reinstate the original 1978 regulation requiring a WCA in its entirety. As
with the 1978 regulation, the CEQ should require agencies to perform a WCA whenever
they undertake an action despite lacking important or essential information regarding the
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action’s adverse environmental impacts. This analysis should also include an indication of
the probability or improbability of the worst-case scenario’s occurrence.
Reinstating the WCA requirement is consistent with section 4331(b)(3) of NEPA, which
states that federal agencies have a responsibility to avoid “unintended” environmental
consequences. Requiring a WCA would also help fulfill NEPA’s twin objectives of full
disclosure and reasoned decision-making.
Considering the worst-case scenario, and airing it to the public, probably would not have
precluded BP’s oil lease or the development of the Macondo well. But including a WCA in
the analysis for the Macondo well would have alerted the public and focused the responsible
parties on the possibility of this kind of disaster in advance. Faced with the risk of an oil
spill of this magnitude, it is far more likely that BP and the MMS would have done more to
ensure that the blowout prevention systems were reliable and that an adequate response and
containment plan was in place before the catastrophe occurred. Without any requirement that
the agency acknowledge or consider this risk, the agency can continue to simply ignore or
hide similar scenarios from the public as it makes decisions in the future.
The White House recently released a report on the MMS’s compliance with NEPA
indicating an awareness of this and other shortcomings with the NEPA process.72 The
recommendations in the report, which the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management,
Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE), the successor agency to the MMS, has agreed to
implement, include:
Ensur[ing] that NEPA documents provide decision-makers with a robust
analysis of reasonably foreseeable impacts, including an analysis of reasonably foreseeable impacts associated with low probability catastrophic spills
for oil and gas activities on the Outer Continental Shelf.73
This is a good start. However, the flaw revealed in this case infects decisions beyond those
involving the Outer Continental Shelf. The CEQ should revise its regulation to require
agencies to perform a WCA whenever they undertake an action for which important or
essential information regarding the action’s adverse environmental impacts is lacking. To be
effective, this analysis should also include an indication of the probability or improbability
of the worst-case scenario’s occurrence.

Including a worstcase analysis in
the NEPA analysis
for the Macondo
well would have
alerted the public
and focused
the responsible
parties on the
possibility of this
kind of disaster

in advance.

Regulatory Failure: Taking Shortcuts Through Categorical Exclusions and
Inappropriate Tiering

As noted above, the CEQ regulations authorize agencies to use “categorical exclusions to
define categories of actions which do not individually or cumulatively have a significant
effect on the human environment and which are therefore exempt from requirements to
prepare an environmental impact statement.”74 The exclusion of appropriate categories
of actions from NEPA analysis makes sense. All agencies engage in minor actions, such
as routine administrative decisions, that legitimately deserve to be exempt from NEPA.
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Preparation of an EIS or even an EA for such actions would be a pointless exercise, given
the nonexistent or benign environmental effects they have.
Over the years, however, some agencies have abused categorical exclusions to avoid
preparing EISs and EAs for proposals that would clearly have, or create a non-trivial risk of,
significant environmental effects. Due to excessively broad application of the categorical
exclusion process, many agency actions that pose serious environmental risks are approved
and implemented without any consideration of their potential adverse consequences.
Further, the abuse of the categorical exclusion process allows these actions to proceed
without public input because agencies sometimes fail to provide public notice before
granting categorical exclusions.
The BP oil spill illustrates the harmful consequences that can result when agencies abuse
categorical exclusions. The MMS approved BP’s exploration plan for the Deepwater
Horizon project under a categorical exclusion. As a result, the MMS did not consider the
potential environmental impacts of BP’s exploration plan for Deepwater Horizon on the
immediately surrounding environment (Mississippi Canyon block 252). Instead, less than
a month after BP submitted its exploration plan, the MMS approved it in a one-page letter
dated April 6, 2009. The letter made no mention of the environmental risks the plan
entailed, noting only that BP should “[e]xercise caution while drilling due to indications of
shallow gas and possible water flow.”
In essence, the MMS justified its categorical exclusion for BP’s exploration plan on the
basis that a NEPA analysis at that particular stage in the OCSLA development program
would have been duplicative of those conducted earlier. As explained above, the MMS
had conducted NEPA analyses at previous stages in the development of BP’s Deepwater
Horizon project, including a programmatic EIS purporting to analyze the potential regionwide environmental impacts of the nationwide five-year oil and gas development plan,
an EIS covering the Central and Western Planning Areas of the Gulf of Mexico (which
includes the site of the Deepwater Horizon project), and an EA for the Central Planning
Area Lease Sale, of which the Deepwater Horizon project was a part. That EA concluded
that the sale would have no significant environmental impacts.
This incorporation of earlier environmental analyses in subsequent EISs or EAs is known as
“tiering.” The use of tiering has become a well-accepted practice under NEPA, recognized
in the CEQ regulations, that is designed to avoid duplicative analysis.75 If an agency has
prepared an EIS on a broad program, there may be no need to repeat that analysis when it
later considers individual projects that are components of the broader program. Tiering
is justified, however, only when all the potential effects of individual implementing actions
have been fully considered at the programmatic stage. Often, it is impossible to engage
in knowledgeable analysis of the effects of individual projects at the programmatic stage
because the location or circumstances of implementing projects are not yet known. In such
cases, reliance on a programmatic EIS to justify categorical exclusion of individual projects
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disguises the agency’s failure ever to consider site-specific, project-level effects, even if they
are potentially catastrophic.
The categorical exclusion used to approve BP’s drilling plan appears in a Department of
the Interior manual governing the application of NEPA to the MMS. The manual largely
endorses the use of tiering by categorically excluding from NEPA analysis many agency
actions that occur later in the OCSLA oil development program, including:
Approval of an offshore lease or unit exploration, development/production
plan or a Development Operation Coordination Document in the central or
western Gulf of Mexico . . . except those proposing facilities: (1) In areas of
high seismic risk or seismicity, relatively untested deep water, or remote areas,
or (2) within the boundary of a proposed or established marine sanctuary,
and/or within or near the boundary of a proposed or established wildlife refuge or areas of high biological sensitivity; or (3) in areas of hazardous natural
bottom conditions; or (4) utilizing new or unusual technology.76
This categorical exclusion is a slight modification of an exclusion adopted by the U.S.
Geological Survey (USGS) when it supervised offshore drilling. The USGS provided no
explanation of why these actions should be categorically excluded.77 The range of actions
currently excluded by the manual is remarkable, ranging from environmentally innocuous
actions such as “approval of Sundry Notices and Reports on Wells” to those with the
potential to create major environmental disruption, such as approval of BP’s exploration
plan for drilling the Macondo well.
Even a cursory look at the MMS’s invocation of the offshore drilling categorical exclusion
for the Deepwater Horizon plan shows that a tiering of NEPA analyses is inappropriate in
the context of approving exploration plans. The MMS used the exclusion to sweep under
the rug the potential risks of drilling a deepwater well in that location. The MMS indicated
that BP’s exploration plan was categorically excluded because the danger of an oil blowout,
and any resulting environmental damage, was minimal or non-existent. The agency simply
accepted at face value, without any independent evaluation or verification, BP’s dubious
assertions that:
•

“The site specific environmental conditions have been taken into account for the
proposed activities and no impacts are expected as a result of these conditions”;

•

“Due to the distance to shore (48 miles) and the response capabilities that would be
implemented, no significant adverse effects [on wetlands] are expected”;

•

“In the event of an unanticipated blowout resulting in an oil spill, it is unlikely to
have an impact based on the industry wide standards for using proven equipment
and technology for such responses. . . .”; and

•

Only “sub-lethal” effects on fish and marine mammals would occur in the event of
a spill.
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Remarkably, the plan admitted also that “[n]o alternatives to the proposed activities were
considered to reduce environmental impacts,” and that “[n]o agencies or persons were
consulted regarding potential impacts associated with the proposed activities.”78
If ever a project was unsuitable for categorical exclusion, this was it. The MMS at least
owed some explanation of why the manual’s bar on categorical exclusions for offshore oil
and gas projects in “relatively untested deep water,” “areas of high biological sensitivity,” or
“utilizing new or untested technology” did not preclude evisceration of the NEPA process
through issuance of a categorical exclusion for the BP well. Similarly, the Department of
the Interior regulations preclude a categorical exclusion if “extraordinary circumstances”
exist. These include actions with significant impacts on public health or safety, significant
impacts on natural resources such as wetlands and migratory birds, highly uncertain and
potentially significant environmental effects or unique or unknown environmental risks, a
direct relationship to other actions with individually insignificant but cumulatively significant
environmental effects, or significant impacts on endangered or threatened species.79 A
drilling project such as BP’s Macondo well would appear to raise serious questions in each of
those areas.
Proposed Reform: Strengthen the Categorical Exclusion Process and Clarify
the Limits of Tiering

Even before the BP oil spill, the CEQ had begun exploring possible changes in the NEPA
process, and categorical exclusions in particular.80 It recognized that categorical exclusions
are no longer the rare exception to the need for NEPA compliance, but “the most frequently
employed method of complying with NEPA.”81 According to the CEQ, the expanded use
of categorical exclusions “has underscored the need for guidance” about their promulgation
and use.
The CEQ’s draft guidance includes worthy proposals that would confine categorical
exclusions to the narrow circumstances for which they were initially envisioned—proposed
actions that have no prospect of creating significant environmental effects and for which
environmental assessment would provide no useful information. The CEQ has proposed
that agencies considering a new categorical exclusion gather and evaluate information
and issue findings to support any conclusion that the excluded activities will not result,
individually or cumulatively, in significant environmental effects. Agencies should similarly
document the application of existing categorical exclusions, including providing supporting
analysis for why the exclusion is not barred by extraordinary circumstances. They should
ensure adequate public involvement before both establishing new and applying existing
exclusions. They should also periodically review existing exclusions to ensure that the
predictions of minimal environmental effects on which they were based have turned out
to be accurate, that circumstances have not changed so as to demand revocation of or
limitations on those exclusions, and that unanticipated extraordinary circumstances have
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not occurred in connection with excluded projects. All of these revisions would help avoid
egregious applications of categorical exclusions such as the one the MMS approved for BP.
Since the blowout occurred, other reviews of the MMS’s implementation of NEPA have
been undertaken. The CEQ initiated a separate review of the MMS’s environmental
policies, practices, and procedures for applying NEPA to oil and gas leasing, exploration,
and development.82 In August, the White House released a more comprehensive report
that includes a recommendation that BOEMRE review the use of categorical exclusions in
light of the complexity and risk associated with deepwater operations, including revisiting
its interpretation of what constitute extraordinary circumstances and reassessing the
adequacy of its consideration of cumulative effects.83 The report indicates that it anticipates
that “for the foreseeable future,” BOEMRE would prepare environmental assessments
at the exploration plan stage.84 This is a wise short-term recommendation but should not
substitute for the broader reforms outlined above.
In addition, the CEQ should consider developing regulations that would require agencies to
seek public input and to solicit the views of federal agencies with relevant expertise before
proposing to rely on a categorical exclusion. For example, such a regulation would require
BOEMRE, before it uses a categorical exclusion for an offshore drilling activity, to solicit the
views of agencies with expertise on the aquatic environment, such as the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which
can provide valuable input on whether the proposed categorical exclusion is appropriate.
Further, the CEQ’s regulations could be written to create a presumption that opposition to
a categorical exclusion by an expert agency would prohibit its issuance. The presumption
would shift the burden to the proposing agency to demonstrate that the project in question
would not, individually or cumulatively, have significant environmental effects and that no
extraordinary circumstances exist that make use of a categorical exclusion inappropriate.
Finally, on the subject of tiering of environmental analyses, the BP oil spill illustrated the
dangers of casual references to more general NEPA documents, like the five-year leasing
programmatic EIS, as a substitute for site-specific analysis of BP’s exploration plan. In its
recent report, the White House addresses this problem and recommends that BOEMRE
review its policies on tiering to ensure that they are clear and are “not being used to limit
site-specific environmental analysis that may be appropriate in certain circumstances, despite
the availability of major, prior environmental reviews and studies.”85 This is an extremely
important recommendation and may capture a problem found not only at the MMS but
in other agencies that employ tiering routinely. The CEQ should consider revising its
tiering regulations to clarify the limits of appropriate tiering, so that it is used only to avoid
inefficient repetition of material already covered, rather than as an excuse to avoid sitespecific assessment.
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Regulatory Failure: Bad Science Undermines NEPA’s Efficacy

When, as with
drilling in the Gulf
of Mexico, there
are thousands
of oil wells
and manned
drilling rigs, the
cumulative risks
posed by the
large number of
activities in the
same area will be
highly significant.

Compounding the problems described above, NEPA’s efficacy was undermined by two
shortcomings in the MMS’s compliance with NEPA. First, the analyses the MMS prepared
to comply with NEPA were profoundly flawed, because they relied on unrealistically
optimistic assumptions about the likelihood of a catastrophic oil spill and the industry’s
capability to contain one if it occurred. Even under the watered-down CEQ regulation, the
agency’s assessment of the risk was woefully inadequate to meet the requirement that the
agency consider reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts, which the regulations
define to include:
[I]mpacts which have catastrophic consequences, even if their probability of
occurrence is low, provided that the analysis of the impacts is supported by
credible scientific evidence, is not based on pure conjecture, and is within the
rule of reason.86
Contrary to this requirement, the agency completely ignored the risk of a serious oil spill.
The programmatic EIS analyzed the possibility of only one spill of about 4,600 barrels
of oil and other smaller spills, and the MMS assumed that only 11,000 to 31,000 barrels
might be spilled into the Gulf for the entire 40-year duration of the Gulf oil and gas
development program. Then both the Multisale EIS and the EA for the specific lease sale
relied on this same grossly inaccurate characterization. In describing the risks to various
resources, including sea turtles, fisheries, and marine mammals, the assessment of the risks
associated with a blowout relied on generalities—that the nature of the risk would depend
on the magnitude and frequency of the accidents, the ability to respond to accidents, the
location and date of accidents, and various meteorological and hydrological factors. This
whitewashing of the prospect of a significant spill reveals a serious problem in the capacity
or independence of the MMS’s scientists who prepared the analysis.
The failure to consider the risk of a catastrophic spill from BP’s Deepwater Horizon project
contributed to the second serious shortcoming in the agency’s assessment under NEPA.
Because the risk of a large spill was simply excluded from consideration, the agency also
overlooked the cumulative risk of a large spill—that is, the impacts on the environment
from the incremental impact of the proposed action when added to past, present, and reasonably
foreseeable future actions. The CEQ regulations require agencies to consider cumulative
impacts even in deciding the threshold question of whether the environmental impacts of
an activity will be significant, and thus require the preparation of an EIS.87 When, as with
drilling in the Gulf of Mexico, there are thousands of oil wells and manned drilling rigs,
the cumulative risks posed by the large number of activities in the same area will be highly
significant.88 Although the risk of a blowout of any individual well may be very low, when
the cumulative risk is considered, the picture of potential impacts changes. Consideration of
the cumulative impact may provide agencies and the public crucial information in deciding
whether the drilling is worth the risk, especially in an area of such environmental and
economic importance as the Gulf of Mexico. But, because the agency failed to realistically
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consider the risks associated with drilling—even setting aside the worst-case scenario—this
information never received consideration.
Moreover, as is explained below, the MMS’s inadequate science compromised the
implementation of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the statute designed to protect
endangered and threatened species, such as whales and sea turtles. The wildlife agencies
charged with implementation of the ESA must rely in large part on the expertise of the
action agency—in this case the MMS—to describe the activity it proposes to take and the
potential hazards the action presents. Indeed, the wildlife agencies cannot be expected
to have the technical expertise necessary to assess the risk of an oil well blowout, or to
determine the size of the spill that a major drilling accident might entail. Although, as
is discussed further in Section IV, the wildlife agencies could and should have demanded
more information and made better decisions, there is no substitute for sound scientific and
technical risk assessments produced by the MMS when making decisions regarding oil and
gas development pursuant to the OCSLA.
Proposed Reform: Provide BOEMRE with Strong and Independent Scientific
Capacity

Section II above describes the institutional problems that have plagued the MMS and the
challenges that must be overcome to eliminate the worst of the problems within BOEMRE.
Given this history, it is critically important that the agency have accurate and independent
scientific information to ensure that the agency makes sound decisions about safety and
environmental protection measures. The reforms already undertaken by the Department of
the Interior and those recommended for legislative action present an enormous challenge for
the agency to integrate. The best option for reforming the BOEMRE’s scientific capacity is
to draw on and enhance existing capacity outside the agency. The USGS already possesses
expertise on biology, geography, geology, geospatial information, and water. With adequate
additional funding and a clear legislative mandate, the USGS would be a logical choice
to support BOEMRE in its compliance with the OCSLA, NEPA, the ESA, the Marine
Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), and other relevant statutes. For technical information,
Congress should create an advisory board—independent of both industry and the agency—
to review risk assessments as well as agency safety regulations and standards. This structural
reform of BOEMRE would improve the agency’s implementation of the OCSLA as well as
ensuring better compliance with NEPA.
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IV. The Endangered Species Act (ESA)
Legal Context: The Role of the ESA in Deepwater Offshore Drilling
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) is the primary U.S. law for protecting animal and
plant species that are in danger of becoming extinct. Its goal is to protect species listed as
threatened or endangered—as well as the ecosystems upon which those species depend—
from being harmed by human activities, whether those activities are carried out by the
federal government or by private individuals.
Section 7 of the statute governs actions taken by federal agencies, such as the Minerals
Management Service (MMS). Specifically, this section requires federal agencies to ensure
that their actions are not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species
or destroy or adversely modify a listed species’ designated critical habitat. To assist
agencies in complying with these prohibitions, section 7 establishes a consultation process
requiring federal agencies to consult with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and/
or the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), as appropriate, before undertaking a
proposed action that may affect listed species or critical habitat. The FWS and/or the
NMFS (collectively “the Services”) then provide the agency with a “biological opinion” as to
whether the proposed action is likely to run afoul of the ban on jeopardy and critical habitat
destruction. In the consultation process, the Services consider both “direct effects” and
“indirect effects.” Direct effects are those that are directly caused by the proposed agency
action. Indirect effects are “caused by the proposed action and are later in time, but still are
reasonably certain to occur.”
The massive scope of the Deepwater Horizon spill and its severe impacts to listed species
and their habitat show that the section 7 process is not working to ensure protection of
imperiled species from deepwater offshore drilling. Indeed, the Deepwater Horizon spill has
already had serious or catastrophic adverse impacts on at least 11 species listed as threatened
or endangered89 under the ESA, and possibly several more. Yet, the NMFS issued a
biological opinion concluding that the lease sales and associated oil and gas activities that
encompassed the Deepwater Horizon project were “not likely to jeopardize” listed species
or destroy or adversely modify designated critical habitat.90 For its part, the FWS did not
even perform a detailed analysis—it simply agreed with the MMS’s finding that oil and gas
activities were “not likely to adversely affect” listed species and their habitat.91 We describe
two failures of the section 7 process in addressing the threats of deepwater offshore drilling,
and how they contributed to the BP oil spill. We also provide recommendations for reform
in both areas.
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Regulatory Failures and Proposed Reforms
Regulatory Failure: Ignoring Low Probability Risks of Catastrophic Harm
to Listed Species

Two separate regulatory inadequacies led the Services to overlook the risk of harm to listed
species and their habitat from a well blowout like the one that occurred. First, the regulatory
mechanisms for ensuring that the Services have adequate information on which to base their
biological opinions are lacking. During section 7 consultations, the Services typically rely
primarily on action agencies to provide them with information to complete the consultation
process, including assessments of risk. This has been problematic in the context of
deepwater offshore drilling, since the MMS routinely underestimated the magnitude of
harm posed by a potential oil spill. According to the lease sale that included the Deepwater
Horizon project, the MMS contemplated only the “unlikely” possibility of a single large
spill of up to 630,000 gallons over the 40 years of oil and gas activities in the lease area.92
Consequently, the section 7 consultation documents provided to the Services for this lease
sale also relied on this faulty estimate, which turned out to be a miniscule fraction of the oil
actually released during the Deepwater Horizon blowout.
Second, apart from the inadequacies of the MMS’s assessments of risk, the Services’
tend to discount risks—even potentially catastrophic ones—if they are deemed to be
low probability. In implementing the ESA’s section 7 consultation process, the Services
generally focus on assessing relatively predictable impacts of planned agency actions (such
as impacts to species and their habitats that attend timber sales, dam operations, wetland
fills, and similar activities), which the Services generally call “direct effects.” While section 7
regulations also require consideration of “indirect effects” of agency actions, such effects are
narrowly defined to include only effects caused by the proposed action that are “later in time,
but still are reasonably certain to occur.”93 So, although there is no question that BP’s exploration
activities approved by the MMS caused the blowout, the definitions of both “direct” and
“indirect” effects seem to permit the Services to ignore effects that are not “reasonably
certain to occur”—such as the consequences of a low probability but catastrophic accident
like what actually took place in the Gulf. In other words, low probability risks are in essence
discounted to zero in the Services’ current implementation of the ESA’s section 7 process.
The Services took this approach to discounting risk when they consulted with the MMS
for the lease sale that included the Deepwater Horizon project. For example, the FWS
found 17 to 27 percent likelihood that an oil spill greater than 1,000 barrels would reach
designated critical habitat of piping plovers. Finding this probability to be “low,” the agency
thus concurred with the MMS’s determination that the leasing and associated activities were
“not likely to adversely affect” listed species and critical habitat.94 As such, the biological
consequences of a potential oil spill—even a catastrophic one—did not constitute indirect
effects, since a spill was not “reasonably certain to occur,” and therefore the FWS was able
to ignore this risk as part of its consultation.
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Virtually no one would get on an airplane if it had a one-in-four risk of crashing. Similarly,
discounting risks of this magnitude to threatened and endangered species and their habitat
is inconsistent with Congress’ intent that the ESA provide these species a high level of
protection. For agency actions that have few direct impacts but pose an indirect, nonnegligible risk of serious or catastrophic harm due to unanticipated problems arising from
the proposed action, the section 7 regulations’ “reasonably certain to occur” standard
enables the Services to simply ignore the risk of potentially serious harm.
Proposed Reform: Ensure Better Assessment of Low Probability Risks of Harm
to Listed Species

To begin with, it is imperative to ensure that the Services receive more accurate information
regarding the magnitude of potential risks associated with proposed federal agency
actions. Elsewhere in this paper, we have recommended improving BOEMRE’s capacity
to generate sound scientific and technical assessments of the risk of drilling. We have also
recommended the reinstatement of worst-case analysis under the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) to ensure accurate assessment of the possible environmental
consequences of oil and gas activities. Both of these reforms are also essential to the section
7 consultation process. Without an accurate risk assessment, no consultation will accurately
assess the risks to listed species and their habitats.
However, the Services also have other tools they can employ in cases in which they realize
that an action agency has provided them with information that fails to adequately consider
the biological impacts of low probability events with potentially serious consequences for
listed species. Specifically, by relying on the ESA’s mandate that federal agencies act on the
basis of the best available scientific information in complying with section 7, the Services
can demand that the action agency use all the available information to supply an analysis
of possible outcomes of the proposed action—including the biological consequences
of outcomes that carry a relatively low risk of taking place, but would have devastating
impacts if they did take place. Thus, the ESA essentially provides its own regulatory basis
for requiring a worst-case analysis for actions that generate risk to listed species and their
habitat. Moreover, the ESA’s section 7 regulations give the Services authority to suspend
the consultation process pending receipt of additional information from an action agency.95
As such, the Services should begin using this authority aggressively to demand from action
agencies better estimates of the magnitude of potential risk associated with their proposed
actions.
In addition, the Services should significantly revise the regulations governing the ESA’s
section 7 consultation process in order to better account for the kind of low probability
catastrophic risks that characterize deepwater offshore drilling. The section 7 process on the
lease decision that included the Deepwater Horizon project demonstrates the need to revise
the Services’ definition of “indirect effects” under the ESA to include low probability but
catastrophic effects. An additional sentence (noted here in italics) should be added so that
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the definition reads as follows: “Indirect actions are those that are caused by the proposed
action and are later in time, but still are reasonably certain to occur. Indirect effects also include
any non-negligible risk of serious or catastrophic impacts due to unintentional consequences of the proposed
agency action.”
This change will ensure that the Services do not discount risks of serious harm to listed
species arising from the unintended consequences of proposed actions merely because
such impacts are not “reasonably certain to occur.” As the Deepwater Horizon spill
dramatically illustrates, taking steps to reduce the risk of disasters that affect listed species
is just as important as reducing direct impacts to these species and their habitat. This change
is also consistent with Congress’ intent that the ESA provide listed species a high level
of protection. For agency actions that have few direct impacts but pose an indirect, nonnegligible risk of serious or catastrophic harm due to unanticipated problems arising from
the proposed action, this revision to the section 7 regulations’ “reasonably certain to occur”
standard will ensure that the Services can no longer simply ignore the risk of potentially
serious harm.
Regulatory Failure: Failure to Aggregate Low Probability Risks

Because of their failure to consider low probability catastrophic risks as “effects,” the
Services have also failed to consider the aggregate low probability risks of consecutive federal
actions. The ESA’s section 7 regulations require consultations to measure the effects of a
proposed federal action against the applicable “environmental baseline”—that is, the state
of the potentially affected area in the absence of the proposed federal action. The purpose
of this requirement is to ensure that the consultation process accounts for past, present,
and reasonably foreseeable future insults to the environment when evaluating the impact
that another insult—the proposed federal action—will have on that same environment.
The section 7 regulations define “environmental baseline” to include “the past and present
impacts of all Federal, State, or private actions and other human activities in the action
area, the anticipated impacts of all Federal projects in the area that have already undergone
formal or early section 7 consultation, and the impact of State or private actions which are
contemporaneous with the consultation in progress.”96
In their consultations on offshore oil and gas activities, however, neither the FWS nor the
NMFS made any effort to consider the aggregate risk of oil spills due to the many separate
MMS oil and gas leasing decisions. In other words, to the extent the Services considered
risk at all, they simply characterized the risks posed by the specific lease sale at issue as low
and thus concluded that the proposed sale was not likely to cause jeopardy or destruction
of critical habitat. However, the combination of many activities with a low probability of
serious harm invariably leads over time to an overall likelihood that such harm will occur
(e.g., an activity that carries a one-in-one hundred chance of causing a serious accident is
virtually certain to cause such an accident if the activity is repeated one hundred times).
Despite this fact, the Services never attempt to aggregate total risk to listed species stemming
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from multiple federal decisions. As a result, the Services end up ignoring ever-increasing
risks to listed species that a serious or catastrophic event, such as a massive oil spill, will
occur, thus significantly under-protecting imperiled species.
Proposed Reform: Ensure That the Services Consider Aggregate Impacts of
Low Probability Risks of Serious Harm

A modest addition to the section 7 regulations would ensure that the agencies no longer
fail to add up risks to listed species from separate federal actions that have already been
approved by the Services after going through the section 7 consultation process. To ensure
proper aggregation of risks to listed species, the regulatory definition of “environmental
baseline” should be expanded by adding the following sentence: “These impacts include any
non-negligible risks of serious or catastrophic impacts due to unintentional consequences
of relevant Federal, State, or private actions.” This simple change would make clear that the
Services should no longer ignore their previous decisions to approve risky activities when
considering whether to authorize additional risks to affected species and their habitat.
The long term effects of the Deepwater Horizon spill could result in the extinction of one
or more threatened or endangered species, and will certainly make recovery of all affected
species much more difficult. The ESA reforms outlined above are crucial to guard against
similar tragic consequences in the future.
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V. The Precautionary Principle
Legal Context: The Role of the Precautionary Principle in Public Safety
and Environmental Law
The last time images of oil-soaked birds and tarred beaches from a ruptured offshore oil
rig flashed across American TV screens, it helped spur a flurry of bipartisan environmental
lawmaking. The Santa Barbara oil spill dumped 80,000 barrels of crude into the Pacific
Ocean off the southern California coast in 1969, and in the next seven years, Congress
passed a half dozen of the major environmental statutes that still protect us today. Those
statutes were animated by an attitude of precaution in the face of environmental risks.
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) forced federal agencies to prepare
Environmental Impact Statements before authorizing risky activities, identifying, among
other things, the potential “irreversible and irretrievable” effects of their actions.97 The
Clean Air Act mandated the adoption of national air quality standards stringent enough to
protect the public health with “an adequate margin of safety.”98 The Endangered Species Act
(ESA) mandated the protection of endangered species “whatever the cost.”99
The Precautionary Principle has subsequently become a pillar of international environmental
law, forming the basis for a whole host of international treaties and agreements. Perhaps the
most prominent articulation of the Principle appears in the 1992 Rio Declaration, negotiated
by the first President Bush: “Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage,
lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective
measures to prevent environmental degradation.” It’s basic common sense. If you don’t
know whether that dark pool ahead of you is quick sand, and you can walk around it without
taking on some other life threatening danger, then spend the extra effort to walk around.
Two important notions animate the Precautionary Principle. The first is the idea that, in
order to prevent harm before it happens, we should act on the basis of reasonable evidence
even before we have full scientific proof that a particular industrial activity causes harm.
The second arises from the insight that not all harms are equal. When harm is irreversible,
you can’t just tote it up alongside economic harms as dollars and cents. You have to take
extra pains to prevent it from happening in the first place. Once oil has spread through
thousands of square miles of ocean, suffocating fish and birds, fouling beaches, coating
wetlands, and poisoning billions of microorganisms that form the building blocks of the
aquatic food chain, you can’t put the genie back in the bottle.
Although, to a large extent, the Precautionary Principle simply enshrines common sense,
virtually all of the incentives that free markets create for corporations push in precisely
the opposite direction. Driven by the profit motive, companies face constant pressure to
save money in the short-term by cutting corners on measures that would reduce long-term
risks of harm to the public and the environment. Their incentive is to downplay risks of
irreversible harm and to emphasize scientific uncertainties as good reason for delaying
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short-term expenditures to avert such harms. Thus, the Precautionary Principle serves as an
important corrective to the distorted incentives created by free markets.
Given its tendency to push back against corporate incentives, it is perhaps no surprise that
the Principle came under attack almost as soon as the ink was dry on Congress’s legislative
initiatives of the 1970s. Some critics charged that it was too strong—that it would require
perfect safety and thus prohibit virtually all economic activity. This criticism, of course,
painted an unduly rigid picture of the Principle, which, by its own terms, sets a clear
threshold for action. The Rio Declaration, for example, requires “threats of serious or
irreversible damage” before precaution is triggered. Other critics argued the opposite—
that the Principle is so vague as to be worthless, or, in a variant of that charge, that it is
indeterminate because all potential actions pose risks on all sides. Favorite and hackneyed
examples included the banning of DDT creating a countervailing risk of increased malaria
in Africa, or stricter screening of new medications by the FDA causing countervailing risks
from the diseases the drugs might have treated. It is no doubt true that such examples pose
difficult decisions for which neither the Precautionary Principle nor any other principle
offers clear guidance. But not every instance of environmental risk takes this symmetrical
form. If, for example, the alternative to assuming the risks of blowouts from offshore oil
drilling is more extensive development of nuclear power, then certainly, there are risks on
both sides. But, if the alternative to blowout risk is asking oil companies to spend a little
more money on safety equipment or instituting measures to conserve energy in order to
extract less oil in the first place, then the choice is not between equivalent risks, but rather
between serious, catastrophic, and irreversible harm on one side and no appreciable risk on
the other.
Despite having been convincingly refuted, these criticisms are continually repeated, and after
decades of attack, the Precautionary Principle is looking worse for wear. It’s been called
“incoherent,” “paralyzing,”100 and “mythical,”101 and the Wall Street Journal editorial page
recently pronounced it a “thoroughly discredited theory.”102 In this atmosphere, it is not
surprising that in the lead up to the Gulf disaster, BP and the Minerals Management Services
(MMS) that was supposed to oversee it did precisely the things that the Precautionary
Principle is designed to protect against. They downplayed and, in some instances, utterly
dismissed the risks to environmental and human health posed by offshore drilling,
demonstrated a complete disregard for the irreversibility of the harms at issue, and failed to
analyze worst-case scenarios.
Regulatory Failures and Proposed Reforms
Regulatory Failure: Failure to Incorporate the Precautionary Principle
into the Regulatory Process

If any economic activity could benefit from the guidance afforded by the Precautionary
Principle, it is deepwater offshore drilling. Various sources have determined that such
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drilling involved a significant risk of catastrophe—that is, a major spill or blowout, such
as occurred at BP’s Deepwater Horizon drilling project. The MMS estimated that the
probability of a spill over 10,000 barrels occurring in the next 40 years was 99 percent.103
A confidential study commissioned by Transocean last year found that in practice blowout
preventers have a failure rate of 45 percent.104
And, as the pictures from the Gulf make all too clear, the potential damage from a
catastrophic spill or blowout was “serious” and quite possibly irreversible. The marine and
coastal ecosystems affected by the spill are some of the most productive in the world. The
region of the gulf in which the spill occurred contains 8,332 species of plants and animals,
including a substantial number of endangered and threatened species.105 And the Louisiana
shoreline contains 40 percent of the nation’s wetlands.106 There is no way to know for sure
what the long-term effects of a spill of this magnitude in the Gulf will be, but research on
past oil spills shows lingering impacts even from spills that occurred decades ago. Fiddler
crabs in a bay on Cape Cod, whose normally deep burrowing behavior plays a crucial role
in the salt marsh ecosystem, are still prevented from digging more than several inches into
the soil by a persistent layer of oil just below the surface, a relic of a 1969 oil spill.107 Studies
in Alaska show that sea otters and other species continue to be harmed by exposure to oil
deposited by the Exxon-Valdez spill over two decades ago.108 And on another spot on Cape
Cod, wetlands soaked in oil from a 1974 spill eroded away when the grasses died and have
never recovered.109
Nevertheless, BP and the MMS failed to follow the Precautionary Principle at several crucial
stages in the lead-up to the massive oil spill. In its Initial Exploration Plan, BP asserted over
and over again that an oil spill was “unlikely,” and therefore concluded that, with respect
to essential fish habitat, marine and pelagic birds, marine mammals, and sea turtles, “no
adverse impacts . . . [were] anticipated.”110 The MMS took a similarly nonchalant attitude
toward the risks. It labeled any spill over 1,000 barrels a “low-probability event,”111 and
did not analyze the impacts of any spill over 4,600 barrels.112 (By the time the BP blowout
was finally capped in mid-July, it had spilled an estimated 4.9 million barrels into the Gulf.)
The MMS also specifically considered the possibility of a blowout, but assumed that most
blowouts would last half a day,113 and ultimately concluded that oil spills or blowouts “are
expected to have temporary localized impacts on water quality,” “are not expected to damage
significantly any wetlands along the Gulf Coast,” and “would have a negligible effect on
[Gulf of Mexico] fish resources.”114
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In evaluating the risks to endangered and threatened wildlife, the MMS and the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service (FWS) concluded that the chances of the drilling project harming such
species’ critical habitat was “low” based on the assumption that a spill would dump only
1,000 to 15,000 barrels of oil into the Gulf.115 This was despite the Agency’s conclusion that
even a small spill of that magnitude would have up to a 27 percent chance of depositing oil
in the critical habitat of some imperiled species. The New York Times quoted a FWS official
as saying that as long as the risk of a catastrophic oil spill from an activity was under 50
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percent, it did not warrant protections from her office.116 This is a striking interpretation of
a statute that the Supreme Court described in 1978 as adopting a stance of “institutionalized
caution.”117
Finally, when carrying out its drilling activities at the Macondo well, BP repeatedly made
decisions to cut corners on safety in order to boost profits. “Time after time, it appears
that BP made decisions that increased the risk of a blowout to save the company time or
expense.”118 BP chose to have (and the MMS chose to require) just one blind shear ram (a
critical component of the blowout preventer that failed on the Deepwater Horizon rig), even
though experts have since 2001 recommended that each rig be outfitted with two.119 It chose
not to install (and the MMS chose not to require) a remote control trigger on its blowout
preventer—a safety device that is standard operating procedure in many other countries.120
It chose to use only a single rather than a double casing on the bottom section of the well,
to forego use of a safety device called a “lockdown sleeve,” and to bypass a recommended
procedure called a “bottoms up” circulation of drilling mud that would have detected stray
gas in the well.121 It chose to use only six “centralizers” on the well casing even though
an engineer from Halliburton advised BP to use 21 and warned that using only six would
cause “a SEVERE gas flow problem.”122 It chose to flout the advice of experts and the
requirements of the MMS’s regulations by not performing a “cement bond log,” a critical
quality check that would have identified channels in the well casing’s cement that could cause
gas flow problems—a decision that one independent expert called “horribly negligent.”123
Proposed Reform: Reinvigorate the Precautionary Principle

There are many lessons to be learned from the Deepwater Horizon tragedy. But one
important lesson is that we need to reinvigorate the Precautionary Principle and reinstate
it as a much-needed corrective against precisely the kind of short-cutting and shortsightedness that led to the catastrophe in the Gulf.
The choices that BP made (and that the MMS allowed them to make) leading up to the
catastrophic blowout were not hard cases under the Precautionary Principle—that is, they
did not involve choices that present significant risks on both sides. Rather, each of these
choices involved on one side a significant risk of serious and irreversible harm—a blowout
causing an unrestrained flow of oil into the Gulf of Mexico—and on the other side, an
additional expenditure of time, money, or effort by BP and a consequent decrease in profits.
Given that these were easy cases, it is likely that the Precautionary Principle would have led
BP to make different decisions that would have been designed to minimize unnecessary risks
of serious public health, safety, or environmental harms.
Quite clearly, the Precautionary Principle was MIA when BP and the MMS repeatedly took
unnecessary risks related to the Macondo well. It has been beaten back by years of attack
by industry and its political allies. Even a statute, like the ESA that was clearly intended to
enshrine a precautionary stance is now interpreted to throw caution to the wind unless the
chances of harm rise above 50 percent. NEPA is no longer interpreted to require analysis
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of a worst-case scenario. In reforms to the OCSLA, Congress should adopt amendments
that better institutionalize an attitude of precaution in the face of serious and irreversible
harm. And the agencies interpreting and implementing NEPA and the ESA should revisit
their interpretations that fail to respect the precautionary mandate that Congress clearly
embodied in these laws.
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VI. U.S. Energy Policy
Legal Context: The Role of U.S. Energy Policy in Deepwater Offshore
Drilling
The United States has never really had a comprehensive energy policy. As a result, we have
never had an effective strategy for balancing the competing interests that determine how we
procure and use energy. These competing interests include energy security, cheap energy,
and non-environmentally harmful energy. Often, the pursuit of one of these interests
comes at the expense of another. Thus, trying to increase fossil fuel production in the
United States may reduce dependency on foreign oil, but it is also likely to have significant
environmental impacts and raise the price of fossil fuel. To make things more complicated,
the United States has historically followed a natural resources policy of transferring publicly
owned resources (such as energy supplies) to the private sector, which in turn has an
incentive to make a profit from these transfers.124
The balancing of environmental concerns in energy policy is especially tricky. The
extraction and utilization of the current dominant forms of energy (i.e., fossil fuels, nuclear,
and hydropower) can be some of the most environmentally harmful activities on earth;
and yet energy supplies are also needed to support our economy and levels of human
development. While we as a country have never fully reconciled these warring interests in
a comprehensive energy and environmental policy, we have, through our environmental
laws, expressed the policy that as energy is produced and utilized, it should not cause
environmental externalities, which can fall on the general citizenry. These environmental
laws include the Clean Air Act125, the Clean Water Act126, and the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA).127
In addition, resource protection laws, such as the Endangered Species Act (ESA)128, the
Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), wetlands protection in the Clean Water Act, and
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) have impacts on the extraction and use of
energy in this country. Because many energy sources are located on federal land or require
federal approval for extraction or utilization, laws that control the activities of federal
agencies (i.e., NEPA, the ESA, and wetlands protection in the Clean Water Act) also have a
significant effect on energy supplies. The federal laws that allow the government to lease or
sell energy resources to the private sector, such as the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
(OCSLA), also require consideration of general environmental values.129
Together, these laws advance the goal of avoiding harm or serious risk of harm to human
health or the environment when extracting or using energy. Put differently, they seek to
ensure that energy pays its own way from cradle to grave. U.S. energy policy—primarily
expressed through congressional legislation and executive orders—often undermines
the pursuit of this goal, however. Several components of our energy policy allow the
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energy sector to escape the full costs of their extraction or utilization activities, leading to
unnecessary environmental and human harm.
Properly understood, the BP oil spill is a direct result of a dysfunctional energy policy, driven
largely by our nation’s addiction to fossil fuels. What else but an addiction to oil would drive
the United States to drill over one mile beneath the ocean’s surface in some of the most
delicate and important ecosystems in the world? In 2007, the United States consumed an
average of 20,680,000 barrels of oil every day.130 With the world’s oil supplies dwindling
quickly, the United States has resorted to extracting oil from remoter and more challenging
sources in order to satisfy its addiction.
Given the technological challenges and substantial risks involved in deepwater offshore
drilling, the occurrence of something like the BP oil spill was not a matter of “if ” but
“when.” Without serious reforms to our energy policy, the next BP oil spill will continue to
loom on the horizon. Below, we describe some of the problematic aspects of our energy
policy that contributed to the BP oil spill. We also provide recommendations for reforming
these aspects of U.S. energy policy.
Regulatory Failures and Proposed Reforms
Regulatory Failure: Subsidizing Unreasonably Risky Offshore Drilling

As a general rule, the U.S. government does not subsidize dangerous or risky activities.
Rather, it often finds that it is good policy to tax these activities to ensure that those who
do engage in them bear their full costs. Thus, the government doesn’t give public money
to smokers to help them pay for cigarettes; instead, it taxes the sale of cigarettes and uses
the proceeds to help offset the costs of providing healthcare services, which smokers
presumably use more of, as a result of their unhealthy activity.
For many decades now, offshore drilling has somehow escaped this sound policy logic.
Beginning with the Reagan Administration, the offshore oil industry has received billions of
dollars in subsidies, in the form of earmarks, tax breaks, and royalty payment exemptions.
These policies have deprived the U.S. Treasury of billions of dollars in revenue, while
encouraging oil companies to engage in unreasonably risky oil extraction activities.
Some of the tax breaks from which the oil industry benefits have been around for nearly
a century, dating back to a time when subsidies were arguably necessary to jumpstart the
fledgling oil extraction industry. Moreover, Congress has failed to repeal to these tax
breaks—and continued to add new ones—even as the oil extraction has grown into one
of the most profitable industries in the world. As a result, today oil extraction is one of
the most heavily subsidized industries in the world.131 According to a 2005 Congressional
Budget Office study, many capital investments associated with oil extraction, including
oil field leases and drilling equipment, are taxed at a rate of only 9 percent—among the
lowest rate for any industry, and significantly lower than the overall rate of 25 percent for
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businesses in general.132 Other oil industry tax breaks include deductions for many drilling
costs and credits for low-volume oil and gas wells. These tax breaks save the oil extraction
industry an estimated $4 billion per year.133 BP’s Deepwater Horizon project benefited from
many of these tax breaks. For instance, before the oil spill, BP was deducting $225,000 a day
by using an oil industry tax break that allowed it to write off 70 percent of the rent it was
paying to Transocean for the Deepwater Horizon oil rig.134
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The royalty exemptions for oil extraction companies are of a more recent vintage, having
been established by Congress in 1995 as part of the Deep Water Royalty Relief Act. The
Act was intended to encourage deepwater drilling activities at a time when oil prices were so
low—about $18 a barrel—as to make these activities unprofitable without a subsidy. Under
the Act, oil extraction companies were permitted to pay reduced royalties on wells leased
between 1996 and 2000 that were located 200 meters or more underwater. The reduction
rate increased proportional to the depth of the well. All reduction rates were only supposed
to be applicable when oil was selling for less than $34 a barrel.135 However, roughly 1,000
leases issued in 1998 and 1999 continue to benefit from the reduced royalty rates—even
though oil now sells for around $70 a barrel—since a clerical error in the leasing contracts
omitted the $34-per-barrel threshold requirement. The Government Accountability Office
(GAO) estimates that these royalty exemptions could cost the U.S. Treasury more than $55
billion in lost revenue over the lifetime of the leases.136
Even without the royalty reductions permitted by the Deep Water Royalty Relief Act, oil
extraction companies operating in the United States enjoy some of the lowest royalty rates in
the world. According to a 2008 GAO report, of the 104 jurisdictions that received royalties
from oil revenue, only 11 had lower payment rates than the United States.137
The most recent comprehensive energy legislation—the Energy Policy Act of
2005—provided billions of dollars of additional subsidies to oil extraction companies at a
time when offshore oil development in the Gulf of Mexico was already in full swing and
oil companies were making record profits. Based on recommendations from then-Vice
President Dick Cheney’s energy task force, the Act contains new tax benefits and royalty
payment exemptions for the oil industry. Significantly, the royalty exemptions apply to
certain existing leases in the Western and Central Gulf of Mexico for wells located 400
meters or more under water, as well as new leases issued within five years after the Act went
into effect.138 The Act also included a $50-million annual earmark to support technical
research for the industry.139
Proposed Reform: Repeal All Subsidies for Offshore Drilling

Congress should take immediate legislative action to eliminate existing subsidies for offshore
drilling activities, including all tax breaks, royalty exemptions, and earmarks. These subsidies
needlessly deprive the U.S. Treasury of billions of dollars in revenues at a time when the
federal government is running up massive deficits. In addition, by enabling oil extraction
companies to escape the full burden of their environmental costs, they encourage them
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to engage in unreasonably dangerous drilling activities. The BP oil spill provides a stark
reminder of the negative consequences that result when oil extraction companies undertake
drilling projects in ecologically sensitive areas that push the technological envelope.
In particular, Congress should identify and eliminate all the various oil extraction industry
tax breaks that have accumulated in the U.S. tax code. Congress should also repeal the Deep
Water Royalty Relief Act. Likewise, Congress should take action to terminate the errant
leases issued under the Deep Water Royalty Relief Act that allow oil companies to continue
enjoying royalty reductions even though oil prices are high. For instance, it could adopt
legislation authorizing the newly created Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation
and Enforcement (BOEMRE) to require these oil companies to renegotiate the errant leases
to reinstate the $34-per-barrel threshold requirement as a condition of negotiating future
offshore drilling leases. Finally, Congress should repeal the various subsidies provided to the
oil extraction industry in the Energy Policy Act of 2005.
The common refrain from the oil extraction industry is that the elimination of these various
subsidies will decimate the offshore drilling industry in the United States, forcing us to
import more oil from abroad and reducing our energy security. This argument doesn’t hold
up under closer scrutiny, however. Thanks to high oil prices, the oil extraction industry has
been turning in record profits for years now, and can easily bear the losses associated with
the elimination of these subsidies. In fact, a study by a Treasury Department economist
concluded that the elimination of oil extraction industry subsidies would decrease
production of American oil by less than one-half of one percent, since prices and industry
profits were so high.140 Consequently, Congress can eliminate these subsidies knowing that
this action will help protect people and the environment without significantly affecting
energy prices or undermining energy security.
Regulatory Failure: Ignoring Climate Change Linkages

The BP oil spill follows from an energy policy that is over a century old and continues to
shape our production, distribution, and consumption of energy while paying scant attention
or giving lip service only to the challenges of climate change. This traditional energy policy
encourages an energy infrastructure and regulatory program that is largely built to support
the production and consumption of large amounts of fossil fuels, regardless of their impact
on the health and safety of citizens and workers, or on the environment in which we work
and live.
With the threat of climate change looming ever larger, the United States needs to adopt a
new approach to energy that is based on sound climate change policy. The failure to reorient
U.S. energy policy to account for climate change concerns has served as a special kind of
subsidy to the carbon intensive fossil fuel industries, enabling unreasonably dangerous
extraction activities, such as the deepwater offshore drilling that led to the BP oil spill. A
properly oriented energy policy will level the playing field, allowing new and emerging
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alternative energy sources to become economically viable, so that the United States is able to
develop a low carbon energy economy.
A sound climate change policy should seek to accomplish two basic goals. First, it should
make sure that carbon intensive energy sources bear the full costs of their impact on climate
change. Climate change already has and will continue to impose greater and greater costs on
society, such as more frequent and more intense weather storm events, increased instances
of disease and heat related deaths, and the extinction of numerous animal and plant species.
Every barrel of oil that is burned to create energy contributes to these costs, but these costs
are not reflected in the price of that oil. As such, that oil is artificially cheap, so producers
tend to overproduce the oil, and consumers tend to over-consume it. By ensuring that
carbon intensive energy sources bear the costs of climate change, marginal or inherently
expensive sources of fossil fuels—including, most oil extracted through deepwater offshore
drilling—would likely become prohibitively expensive, and would be abandoned immediately.
Second, a sound climate change policy should seek to help industry and academia develop
and promote innovations in alternative energy sources and in energy efficiency so that low
carbon energy becomes comparable in cost to fossil fuels. As noted above, there was a
time when the United States subsidized the fossil fuel industries to help spur innovations
in nascent extraction and distribution technologies, so that reliable and low cost energy
could be made more widely available. A similar approach should be taken with respect
to alternative energy sources and energy efficiency innovations. This will enable the U.S.
economy to reorganize itself around low carbon energy sources on its own, since the low
carbon energy sources will be competing on a more level playing field with traditional fossil
fuels. In addition, by making cheap and reliable alternative energy and energy efficiency
innovations more widely available, this will minimize economic dislocation for the poorest
members of U.S. society, while we more toward a more environmentally sustainable future.
Importantly, the transition to a low carbon energy economy will minimize, or possibly even
eliminate, our current reliance on deepwater offshore drilling.
Proposed Reform: Adopt an Effective Climate Change Policy

The United States should adopt an effective climate change policy as soon as possible. Such
a policy will not only help us to avoid the worst consequences of climate change, but it will
also help to avoid the future occurrence of catastrophic oil spills arising from deepwater
offshore drilling.
Consistent with a sound climate change policy, the United States should take a number
of steps to ensure that carbon intensive energy sources bear the full costs of their impact
on climate change. Most importantly, the United States must place a price on carbon,
either through a carbon tax or through a cap-and-trade regimen, so that all social costs
are incorporated into the price of energy. To ensure the effectiveness of carbon pricing,
the United States should also eliminate all remaining subsidies for fossil fuels, as explained
above. This should also include the normalization of tax and accounting rules so that the
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oil industry is treated like all other businesses. These steps will ensure that the price of fossil
fuels reflects its true social cost, so that it is not overproduced and over-consumed to the
detriment of society.
In addition, the United States should seek to promote innovations in alternative energy
and energy efficiency, so that these technologies are able to compete on a level playing field
with fossil fuels in the energy market. Our future energy policy depends upon a significant
increase in research, development, demonstration, and employment money for a wide
variety of innovative energy technologies with the goal of bringing them to scale.141 Federal
research and development policy must act in partnership with the private sector, including
for-profit and nonprofit actors, to fund innovation from basic science to commercial
marketability. In addition, the United States should consider employing rate incentives to
construct a smart grid (i.e., an electricity transmission system that delivers electricity from
suppliers to consumers using two-way digital technology to control appliances at consumers’
homes to save energy, reduce cost, and increase reliability and transparency), expand the use
of renewable resources to generate electricity, decentralize production and distribution of
electricity through distributed generation, and promote energy efficiency measures such as
net metering and smarter appliances and homes.
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VII. Lessons from the North Sea
Legal Context: Regulation of Offshore Drilling in the United Kingdom
and Norway
The United Kingdom Experience

On July 6, 1988, the Occidental Petroleum offshore oil and gas production platform known
as Piper Alpha exploded and burned into the sea, killing 167 workers (59 people survived).
Located about 120 miles northeast of the Scottish city of Aberdeen, which is the land
headquarters of British oil and gas production on the Upper Continental Shelf, the platform
rested in about 474 feet of water. It was enormous, accounting for approximately 10 percent
of total North Sea production. Total insured loss was estimated at about $3.4 billion in 1988
dollars. The destruction of Piper Alpha remains the worst disaster in the history of offshore
drilling in terms of lives lost.
The discovery of petroleum reserves in the North Sea in the late 1960s was perceived as an
economic miracle in Britain, staving off grave financial hardship and allowing the country
to reclaim its position as an industrial powerhouse within the European community. Few
people have ever looked this providential gift horse in the mouth, and the responsibility for
imposing worker safety regulation on the platforms and rigs that sprouted up across the
stormy and forbidding North Sea was delegated to the same agency that granted drilling
licenses and collected royalties for the government. The Piper Alpha disaster provoked
a harshly negative public reaction and prompted work stoppages among a usually docile
workforce. The government convened a two-year inquiry headed by Lord William Douglas
Cullen, a senior Scottish judge, which culminated in the Cullen Report, a classic in both
accident investigation and policy prescription.
Piper Alpha was originally designed to produce oil, but Occidental was in the process of
converting it to gas production when the explosion occurred. Mistakes in that process
undoubtedly contributed to the disaster. For example, the firewalls separating the control
room from an area where produced gas was compressed were not built to withstand
explosions. The control room was abandoned early in the crisis, destroying any hope of
maintaining a semblance of command on the platform.
The proximate cause of the initial explosion was human error involving a lack of
communication between two shifts of workers. During the course of routine maintenance,
a crew had removed a pressure safety valve from the relief line of one of two condensate
injection pumps (used to relieve the pressure of gas as it was pumped from the deep
well) and replaced it with a blank flange assembly (akin to a flat metal disk). At the time,
that pump was not operational. When the handover to the night shift occurred, no one
mentioned this piece of routine maintenance verbally, although witnesses later testified that a
sheet of paper, known as a “permit to work” had been completed instructing the night shift
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not to turn on the second pump. This document was never found. The night shift tried to
start the pump up, the blank flange assembly leaked, and a large amount of gas built up quite
quickly.
Explosion of this gas led to a large crude oil fire, which in turn evolved into a second
explosion and an even more devastating fire, largely because workers on two sister platforms,
the Tartan and the Claymore, located within 12 and 22 miles from the mother platform,
did not stop pumping into the pipelines they all shared, in effect feeding a fire that might
otherwise have burned itself out. Lord Cullen discovered that even as they watched the
Piper Alpha burn, the men in command on the Tartan came to blows, with one man refusing
to listen to the other’s advice that he shut down the pumping operation, claiming he needed
permission from corporate headquarters in Aberdeen to take such a drastic step.
Lord Cullen also found that although Occidental had anticipated the possibility of such a
disastrous chain reaction, neither the onshore regulatory authority nor the company had
planned an effective response, including training workers on evacuation procedures. He
noted that the regulatory authority had inspected Piper Alpha only a month before the
explosion, but that the inspection was so superficial that it was of little use. He called for a
comprehensive overhaul of the entire regulatory system, beginning with the separation of
royalties collection from the safety inspection function.
The causes and consequences of the Deepwater Horizon disaster are eerily reminiscent of
Lord Cullen’s account of what happened on Piper Alpha:
•

As at Piper Alpha, a weak and inherently conflicted regulatory regime left a complex
industry operating in a dangerous, unforgiving environment to its own devices, with
dire consequences that appear to have been entirely preventable.

•

As at Piper Alpha, advance plans for the design and operation of the Horizon rig
were grossly insufficient, leading to short cuts and pressure to forge ahead with
production that would prove fatal.142

•

Like the Piper Alpha incident, signs of trouble on the Horizon began to accumulate
hours, days, and even weeks before the chain reaction began.143

•

Poor communication between workers on both Piper Alpha and the Deepwater
Horizon, as well as lax safety training with respect to routine maintenance activities,
led to an unstoppable chain reaction.144

•

Once the explosion and fire began, the chain of command on Piper Alpha and the
Deepwater Horizon became dysfunctional, with rescue operations fundamentally
compromised.145

The failure of U.S. regulators to learn from mistakes made in a country so closely related
to the United States by history and language is a disconnect in public policymaking that we
cannot afford to repeat.
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The Norwegian Experience

British regulators
leave virtually
all of the details
of designing
an effective
safety system
to corporate
platform
operators through
the preparation
of facility-specific
“safety cases.”

As in Britain, the petroleum industry is central to the Norwegian economy, and the country
ranks as the world’s fifth largest oil exporter and 11th largest oil producer. Some 60 fields in
the Norwegian Continent Shelf produce about 2.5 million barrels annually. Unlike Britain,
the Norwegians made a decision to invest heavily in Statoil, the largest holder of drilling
licenses in the county, 67 percent of which is publicly owned. One of the largest oil fields
in the North Sea, known as Ekofisk, is located about 200 miles southwest of the Norwegian
city of Stavanger, that country’s equivalent of Aberdeen. In 1977, about six years after
production in this area began, the Bravo platform owned by Phillips Petroleum had a
blowout, once again due to human error, spilling an estimated 80,000-120,000 barrels of oil
into the North Sea. No lives were lost, but the spill remains the largest on record in the area.
British and Norwegian Responses

In the wake of the Cullen Report, the British Parliament transferred responsibility for
regulation of offshore drilling to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), the English
equivalent of the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration. The HSE was already
in the throes of adopting “goal-oriented” regulation to replace “command and control”
regulation. Proponents justified this transformation as superior to the old regime because
making individual companies responsible for designing their own safety systems would instill
a far more effective “culture of safety” than prescribing a series of rigid rules that devolved
to simple, relatively mindless “box ticking.” To develop redundant systems capable of
preventing accidents on facilities that are akin to building a dormitory on top of a deepwater
volcano would take bottom up, fully integrated cooperation by everyone on a rig.
Consequently, the HSE leaves virtually all of the details of designing an effective safety
system to corporate platform operators through the preparation of facility-specific “safety
cases.” The HSE’s experts review each safety case and periodically inspect platforms and
rigs to ensure that these plans are implemented. But, at least in theory, each plan could be
very different from plans for other facilities, even facilities owned by the same company,
and still receive regulatory approval. The HSE deemphasizes enforcement for failures
to implement safety cases, once again focusing on establishing a positive, cooperative
relationship with the oil and gas industry in the North Sea.
Safety cases are prepared by consultants in accordance with a set of regulations that explain,
in essence, what topics must be covered in each plan, but do not specify the content of
the plan.146 So, for example, rather than specifying the equipment that must be kept in the
infirmary on a large rig, the regulations specify that the rig operator must ensure that people
present on the rig receive effective emergency medical treatment—a dicey proposition in the
case of a serious accident since rigs can be located as far as a two or three hour helicopter
ride offshore. Other topics to be addressed include standards and procedures for controlling
risks, competence and training, selection of key personnel, control of change (of shifts,
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of design, of production goals), selection and control over contractors, and planning and
control for emergencies.
Safety cases are expected to achieve the overall goal of “an individual risk of death of 10-3
[1 in 1,000] per year.”147 This level of risk is quite high and compares unfavorably to the
levels Americans typically accept in the context of environmental exposures: 1 in 100,000 or
1 in 1,000,000. In determining whether to require a company to install a specific piece of
equipment or implement a specific design, the regulations state that the measure must not
be “grossly disproportionate” to the benefit gained.148 They add that an offshore operator
should be expected to shoulder an “implied cost” generally measured as six times the value
of each life saved, with a life worth £1 million (about $1.56 million in August of 2010).
Again, this allocation is quite low compared to similar American cost-benefit analyses.
One final feature of the British system of overriding importance is that all safety cases are
held in the strictest confidence. No one except the consultants, top level management, and
the assigned agency official is allowed to see the finished document in its entirety, ostensibly
because such documents include sensitive trade secrets such as the precise dimensions of
the oil reservoir upon which the platform or rig is located.149 Safety representatives chosen
by oil rig workers may review safety cases as they are being formulated and can obtain
summaries of the documents and extracts, but are not given a full copy to retain.
Britain does not have any independent auditing institutions such as America’s Government
Accountability Office or Inspectors General that can conduct independent reviews of
circumstances on the rigs. However, Britain has a judicially-based process known as a “fatal
accident inquiry” that is convened every time a person dies in custody or a worker is killed in
an accident on the job.150 Trial judges (called “sheriffs”) hear witnesses and make findings,
including recommendations about how to prevent similar incidents in the future. Several
high-profile inquiries have involved safety offshore, and serve as a separate incentive for
improving accident prevention and response.
In Norway, the combination of the Bravo blowout and the Piper Alpha catastrophe
provoked the establishment of the country’s systematic safety regulations, and an informal
rivalry has since arisen between Norwegian and British authorities over which country
enjoys the best safety record and has the most stringent regulations. The Petroleum
Safety Authority (PSA) is the Norwegian equivalent of Britain’s HSE. It has issued
a comprehensive set of regulations governing everything from the design and safety
equipment that must be installed on a platform to emergency response planning and
preparedness.151 The regulations provide for enforcement, including the assessment of
penalties for violations of their requirements. They are significantly more prescriptive than
their British counterparts, although Norwegian regulators also describe their regulatory
structure as a “goal-oriented” and “cooperative” with industry, perhaps an easier claim to
make since the largest share of the market is held by a nationalized corporation.

Regulatory Blowout: How Regulatory Failures Made the BP Disaster Possible

Page 58

Center for Progressive Reform

Regulatory Failures and Proposed Reforms
Regulatory Failure: Ignoring Other Countries’ Experiences with Offshore
Drilling Disasters

Congress and the MMS have failed to pay attention to the experience of other offshore oil
producing countries. They have not assessed other regulatory approaches or incorporated
the lessons learned from accidents, blowouts, and spills that have occurred elsewhere.
Numerous reports have now brought to light regulatory requirements imposed by other
countries—including the United Kingdom, Norway, Canada, and Brazil—that might possibly
have prevented the BP oil spill or significantly improved the U.S. response capability. This
reactive approach to evaluating the experience abroad simply made it more likely that we
would have to suffer our own disaster before we learned lessons from the experience of
other countries.
Proposed Reform: Mandate Systematic Review of the Experience of Other
Countries and Incorporate into Routine Congressional Oversight

Numerous criticisms can and have been made of the British and Norwegian regulatory
approaches, and aspects of their approaches may not be compatible with the American
regulatory framework.152 But investigations of accidents that occur abroad and analyses
of the weaknesses in other countries’ regulatory systems can highlight similar weaknesses
in the U.S. system, prompting needed reforms. In the wake of the BP spill, the idea of the
safety case, a prominent feature of the British system, is now being debated in congressional
hearings and proposed legislation. Whether or not this concept or any particular technique
or requirement is ultimately adopted, an evaluation of other approaches that have proven
effective elsewhere should not occur simply in reaction to a disaster.
Instead, Congress should ensure that BOEMRE undertakes an ongoing, systematic
evaluation of the lessons learned elsewhere in the wake of serious accidents, and of
alternative regulatory measures and techniques that have proven effective. With greater
attention to the regulatory approaches of other countries, BOEMRE and legislative
oversight committees could ensure not only that U.S. safety and environmental regulation is
the best it can be, but also that royalty rates, bonding requirements, and other aspects of the
oil leasing system are adequate. These additional sources of experience and information can
also help to enhance U.S. regulators’ knowledge about industry practices and technology, an
area that has been identified as a pervasive weakness in the MMS during the years leading up
to the BP oil spill.
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